Chinese cyber espionage: a complementary method to aid PLA modernization by Ellis, Jamie M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-12
Chinese cyber espionage: a complementary method
to aid PLA modernization
Ellis, Jamie M.







Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
CHINESE CYBER ESPIONAGE: A COMPLEMENTARY 
METHOD TO AID PLA MODERNIZATION 
by 
Jamie M. Ellis 
December 2015 
Thesis Advisor: Wade L. Huntley 
Second Reader: Christopher R. Twomey 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
CHINESE CYBER ESPIONAGE: A COMPLEMENTARY METHOD TO AID 
PLA MODERNIZATION 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Jamie M. Ellis
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     




MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
In 2013, Mandiant published a report linking one People’s Liberation Army (PLA) unit to the virtual 
exploitation of 11 modern U.S. military platforms. In the last two decades, Chinese cyber espionage has 
cultivated a significant reputation in cyberspace for its high-volume, illicit exploitation of defense 
technology. At the same time, the PLA has also rapidly modernized its naval, fighter jet, and air defense 
technologies. This thesis examines trends in Chinese cyber espionage, PLA modernization, and PLA 
acquisitions methods to determine—from only open-source information—if the categories are related and, 
if so, the nature of the relationship. 
Defense reports suggest there is a strong correlation between China’s virtual exfiltration of modern 
U.S. technology and the PLA’s rapid advancement; cyber espionage is the principal driver for PLA 
modernization. This thesis asks: Does cyber espionage really play a central role in PLA modernization, or 
does it simply complement alternate procurement methods? This thesis draws from case studies of China’s 
overt acquisitions, indigenous research, and physical espionage operations to demonstrate that the majority 
of the PLA’s modernized military platforms were developed from non-cyber acquisition methods. These 
studies support this thesis’s conclusion that cyber espionage is not the critical component driving forward 
PLA modernization. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS





















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
CHINESE CYBER ESPIONAGE: A COMPLEMENTARY METHOD TO AID 
PLA MODERNIZATION 
Jamie M. Ellis 
Captain, United States Air Force 
B.S., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2010 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE PACIFIC) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2015 
Approved by: Wade L. Huntley 
Thesis Advisor 
Christopher R. Twomey 
Second Reader 
Mohammed Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




In 2013, Mandiant published a report linking one People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) unit to the virtual exploitation of 11 modern U.S. military platforms. In the last 
two decades, Chinese cyber espionage has cultivated a significant reputation in 
cyberspace for its high-volume, illicit exploitation of defense technology. At the same 
time, the PLA has also rapidly modernized its naval, fighter jet, and air defense 
technologies. This thesis examines trends in Chinese cyber espionage, PLA 
modernization, and PLA acquisitions methods to determine—from only open-source 
information—if the categories are related and, if so, the nature of the relationship. 
Defense reports suggest there is a strong correlation between China’s virtual 
exfiltration of modern U.S. technology and the PLA’s rapid advancement; cyber 
espionage is the principal driver for PLA modernization. This thesis asks: Does cyber 
espionage really play a central role in PLA modernization, or does it simply complement 
alternate procurement methods? This thesis draws from case studies of China’s overt 
acquisitions, indigenous research, and physical espionage operations to demonstrate that 
the majority of the PLA’s modernized military platforms were developed from non-cyber 
acquisition methods. These studies support this thesis’s conclusion that cyber espionage 
is not the critical component driving forward PLA modernization. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS 
In 2007, the U.S. Air Force reported that Chinese cyber espionage operations 
exploited terabytes of confidential U.S. government and military data.1 In 2013, 
Mandiant, published a report linking one People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cyber unit to 
the virtual exploitation of 11 modern U.S. military platforms. In June 2015, the United 
States accused China of sponsoring a cyberattack against the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) that breached over four million U.S. government workers’ security 
clearance information.2 Just one month prior, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
indicted three Tianjin University professors and three other People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) nationals for economic cyber espionage.3 Over the last two decades, China has 
cultivated a significant reputation in the virtual realm for its illicit acquisition of foreign 
technology and trade secrets through cyber espionage.4 China is not the only nation to 
engage in cyber activities targeting other states: Russia, the United States, Japan, Israel, 
Iran, and North and South Korea also have significant virtual presences.5 China’s 
                                                 
1 Desmond Ball, “China’s Cyber Warfare Capabilities,” Security Challenges 7, no. 2 (Winter 2011): 
88, http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no2Ball.pdf; Bryan Krekel, Capability of the 
People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation for the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission (McLean, VA: Northrup Grumman, 2009), 51, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-030.pdf. 
2 Ellen Nakashima, “Chinese Hackers Breach Federal Government Personnel Office,” Washington 
Post, June 4, 2015, http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/chinese-hackers-breach-federalgovernment%e2% 
80%99s-personnel-office/ar-BBkHFqx.   
3 “U.S. Indicts 6 Chinese Citizens with Economic Espionage,” PressTV, May 19, 2015, 
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/05/19/411879/US-Justice-Department-China-economic-espionage; Gina 
Chon, “U.S. Accuses Chinese Professors of Spying,” Financial Times, May 19, 2015, http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/5268d752-fe3b-11e4-be9f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3azag9iPl; Greg Austin, “What the U.S. 
Gets Wrong About Chinese Cyberespionage,” Diplomat, May 26, 2015, China-U.S. Focus, 
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-chinesecyberespionage/.   
4 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China 2015 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 7, 2015), 54–55, 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf; Austin, “What U.S. Gets Wrong.” 
5 Martin C. Libicki, Lillian Ablon, and Andrea A. Golay, Markets for Cybercrime Tools and Stolen 
Data: Hacker’s Bazaar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 6, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR610/RAND_RR610.pdf. 
 2 
authoritarian government structure, however, makes its cyber profile unique in that the 
deeper motivations for China’s targeted cyber campaigns are unclear and ambiguous.6  
China’s 2015 Defense White Papers assert that cybersecurity development and 
preparation for winning “informationized wars” are the PRC’s and PLA’s top priorities, 
but China’s method of accomplishing these objectives is enigmatic.7 The increased 
frequency of Chinese cyber intrusions could be a method to aid its economic 
development, an advantageous tool to uncover adversarial vulnerabilities, an application 
to assist China’s Communist Party’s (CCP) foreign policy objectives, or a purely 
commercial endeavor conducted by private actors outside of significant central 
government authority.  
Amid the ambiguity, however, Department of Defense (DOD) and government-
sponsored reports (like U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
publications, DOD reports, and U.S. think tank studies) compare the upsurge in Chinese 
cyber espionage with the PLA’s rapid twenty-first century modernization and make a key 
assumption that cyber espionage is the primary force behind the PLA’s rapid 
advancement—often without establishing the basis for that claim.8 For example, a U.S.-
                                                 
6 Jon R. Lindsay, “The Impact of China Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction,” International Security 
39, no. 3 (Winter 2014–2015): 7–9, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/IS3903_pp007-047.pdf; Jon R. 
Lindsay, “Inflated Cybersecurity Threat Escalates Mistrust,” Huffington Post, May 18, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-r-lindsay/cybersecurity-threat-escalates-us-china-mistrust_b_ 
7302282.html; Lawrence J. Cavaiola, David D. Gompert, and Martin C. Libicki, “Cyber House Rules: On 
War, Retaliation and Escalation,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 57, no. 1 (February-March 2015): 
81, http://www.iiss.org/en/Topics/chinas-cyber-policy/57-1-07-cavaiola-gompert-and-libicki-3ab8.   
7 “Document: China’s Military Strategy,” USNI News, May 26, 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/05/ 
26/document-chinas-military-strategy#BDC; Franz-Stefan Gady, “China to Embrace New ‘Active Defense’ 
Strategy,” Diplomat, May 26, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-to-embrace-new-active-defense-
strategy/; Annual Report to Congress: 2015, I; Neil Robinson, “Cybersecurity Strategies Raise Hopes of 
International Cooperation,” RAND Review, RAND, last modified July 11, 2013, http://www.rand.org 
/pubs/periodicals/randreview/issues/2013/summer/cybersecurity-strategies-raise-hopes-of-international-
cooperation.html.    
8 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities,” 
2013 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: USCC), 244–45, 259, 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%3B%20Section%202%20China%27s%20Cyber%20
Activities.pdf; Annual Report to Congress: 2015, 22, 35; Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Department of Defense, 2014), 35, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DOD_China_Report.pdf; 
Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving 
Balance of Power 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 24–25, http://www.rand.org/ 
pubs/research_reports/RR392.html. 
 3 
China Economic and Security Review Commission publication asserts that, “China’s 
cyber espionage…of U.S. military contractors likely improves China’s insight in U.S. 
weapons systems…and shortens China’s research and development timelines for military 
technologies.”9 An excerpt from the 2015 Annual Report to Congress on the “Military 
and Security Developments Involving the [PRC]” also demonstrates this assumption: 
“China is using its cyber espionage capabilities to support intelligence collection against 
U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors…The information 
targeted could potentially be used to benefit China’s defense industry.”10 While there are 
likely classified analyses on the subject, there are not widely accessible, open-source 
assessments that directly address these assumptions. 
Consequently, this thesis addresses China’s increased use of exploitive cyber 
methods with regard to PLA modernization to demonstrate how they are related. The 
major research question for this thesis is: How do suspected Chinese cyber espionage 
campaigns fit into the PLA military’s modernization strategy? Using exclusively open-
source information, this thesis seeks to understand China’s interpretation of its own cyber 
strategy and determine the historical, internal, and external motivating factors that drive 
China’s use and employment of cyber espionage. Through a study of PLA modernization 
initiatives and exploitive Chinese cyber operations, this thesis investigates if cyber 
espionage plays a central, limited, or complementary role in accelerating China’s military 
advancement.  
This thesis employs case studies of Chinese cyber intrusions, virtually exploited 
U.S. military technologies, developmental timelines of modern PLA military technology, 
and alternate PLA procurement methods, to show that government-sanctioned cyber 
espionage is a complementary (not a primary) acquisition method. This thesis first 
examines 24 cases of noted, historical Chinese cyber espionage operations (Byzantine 
Hydes, Ghost Net, Shady Rat, etc.) and their respective military, government, or private 
industry targets. Based on this, it is shown that approximately 33 percent (one-third) of 
the cyber intrusions on military and defense objectives likely assisted PLA military 
                                                 
9 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities,” 258. 
10 Annual Report to Congress: 2015, 39. 
 4 
modernization; approximately 42–44 percent (a little over one-third) of the cyber 
espionage operations likely assisted China’s domestic development goals; and 
approximately 38–42 percent (a little over one-third) percent of the cyber intrusions 
likely aided CCP foreign policy objectives. The percentages vary based on the wide range 
of exploited targets in individual computer network exploitation (CNE) operations: some 
cyber espionage campaigns exploited military, economic, and diplomatic objectives 
under the same operation, and some campaigns only exploited one or two categories at a 
time.11 The evidence of China’s relatively equal cyber exploitation record across three 
developmental categorical target areas highlights the divided focus of the Chinese 
government’s sponsored cyber espionage operations. 
Focusing on the first of these categories, this thesis then examines the PLA’s 
alternate acquisitions methods—negotiated military technology purchases from foreign 
governments, negotiated trade agreements, traditional espionage operations, and 
indigenous research and development (R&D) programs—and compares them with the 
PLA’s developmental timelines of critical, modern military technologies. This study 
identifies 21 modernized PLA military platforms (study pulls examples from the PLA Air 
Force [PLAAF], PLA Navy [PLAN], and PLA Army), their U.S. equivalent model, and 
their developmental timelines to determine if the means of their production were 
primarily due to cyber espionage. It concludes approximately 19 percent of these military 
platforms were likely exclusively developed from cyber espionage exploits; 
approximately 48 percent of the military platforms were likely developed from 
exclusively non-cyber acquisition methods (whether by reverse engineering, overt 
purchases, technology trade agreements, or traditional espionage); and approximately 33 
percent were likely developed from a combination of cyber espionage and non-cyber 
procurement methods. Put another way, over 80 percent of the 21 cases involve non-
cyber acquisition methods, while only 52 percent of the cases include cyber espionage.12 
                                                 
11 Cyber espionage operations, or campaigns, can last several days, weeks, months, or years without 
the affected entity knowing. A single cyber espionage campaign constitutes one cyber actor exploiting one 
target, or the same target, for information no matter the length of the exfiltration operation. 
12 The variance in the percentages is due to the inclusion of cases that employed both cyber and non-
cyber means. 
 5 
This study confirms that cyber espionage assists PLA modernization efforts, but it 
also shows that non-cyber espionage procurement methods are used in the majority of 
PLA modernized military platform cases. The PLA’s use of robust alternate procurement 
methods on the majority of its modernized PLA equipment suggest that government-
sponsored cyber espionage complements existing PLA procurement processes to 
modernize the PLA military. Since this thesis relies exclusively on publicly available 
information, the research findings could need to be modified if classified information 
released in the future or other future research presents information that contradicts this 
study’s conclusions. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The world is exploding with rapid technology changes, cyber network 
interoperability, and proliferated Internet access across the globe. The interconnected 
nature of the Information Age has introduced a host of new cyber exploitation areas on 
which governments, industries, and cyber criminals capitalize.13 Due to their advanced 
technological capabilities, Russia and the United States have been the frontrunners in 
cyber warfare. Within the last decade, however, the PRC was added to the list as a 
frequent suspect in cyber espionage cases.14 Primarily among U.S. defense reports, one 
area of agreement is that PRC-sponsored cyberattacks are increasing at an enormous rate, 
which may provide long-term advantages for PLA military capabilities.15 From DOD 
cyber missions to President Barak Obama’s foreign policy priorities, cybersecurity has 
become a top concern for the United States; as Obama explained: 
                                                 
13 U.S. International Strategy for Cybersecurity, Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, 
and International Cybersecurity Policy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Cong. (March 14, 2015) 
(statement of James A. Lewis, Director for Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies), 1, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051415_REVISED_Lewis 
_Testimony.pdf; Timothy L. Thomas, “China’s Cyber Incursions: A Theoretical Look at What They See 
and Why They Do It Based on a Different Strategic Method of Thought,” OE Watch (March 2013): 1–2, 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/China’s-Cyber-Incursions.pdf; Paul Cornish, “Governing 
Cyberspace through Constructive Ambiguity,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 57, no. 3 (June-July 
2015): 153, http://www.iiss.org/en/Topics/chinas-cyber-policy/57-3-09-cornish-a772.  
14 Robinson, “Cybersecurity Strategies Raise Hopes”; James A. Lewis, “To Protect the U.S. Against 
Cyberwar, Best Defense is a Good Offense,” U.S News and World Report, March 29, 2010, 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/03/29/to-protect-the-us-against-cyberwar-best-defense-is-a-
good-offense; Cavaiola, Gompert, and Libicki, “Cyber House Rules,” 81. 
15 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Cyber Activities,” 259. 
 6 
America’s economic prosperity, national security, and our 
individual liberties depend on our commitment to security 
cyberspace and maintaining an open, interoperable, secure, and 
reliable Internet. Our critical infrastructure continues to be at risk 
from threats in cyberspace, and our economy is harmed by the theft 
of our intellectual property…the threats are serious and they 
constantly evolve.16 
As President Obama’s statement implies, the United States faces many challenges 
in cyberspace—specifically the challenge of how to defend against the increased cyber 
exploitation of its critical technologies.17 Testimony at U.S. Senate hearings also upholds 
the White House’s emphasis on cybersecurity, but concludes that the growing concern 
lies with Chinese-sponsored, “cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property for commercial 
gain.”18 How can the United States and other countries protect their military technology 
from PRC-sponsored cyber spying if they do not understand China’s cyber strategy?19 
What are the drivers for China’s cyber espionage targets; why does it continually direct 
attacks toward companies like Northrup Grumman, Lockheed Martin, or U.S. Internet 
search engines?20 These questions demonstrate the voiced confusion and lack of 
understanding among top political, defense, and government officials about the upward 
                                                 
16 Barak Obama, “Cybersecurity,” Foreign Policy, U.S. Whitehouse, accessed May 19, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity#section-engage-internationally. 
17 Richard B. Andres, “The Emerging Structure of Strategic Cyber Offense, Cyber Defense, and Cyber 
Deterrence,” in Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World, 
ed. Derek S. Reveron (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 89–90, 
https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/books/9781589019195/9781589019195-12.pdf. 
18 Cybersecurity: Setting the Rules for Responsible Global Behavior, Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, 
Cong. (May 14, 2015) (statement of Christopher M. E. Painter, U.S. Department of State Coordinator for 
Cyber Issues), 4, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051415_Painter_Testimony.pdf; George 
Leopold, “China’s Military Calls for ‘Online Great Wall,’” Defense Systems, Public Sector Media Group, 
last modified May 21, 2015, http://defensesystems.com/articles/2015/05/21/china-pla-online-great-
wall.aspx.  
19 Timothy L. Thomas, “China’s Concept of Military Strategy,” Parameters 44, no. 4 (Winter 2014–
2015): 39, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/Winter_2014-
15/7_ThomasTimothy_ChinasConceptofMilitaryStrategy.pdf.  
20 Dmitri Alperovitch, “Revealed: Operation Shady RAT,” McAfee, 3–4, accessed June 3, 2015, 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf; Timothy L. Thomas et al., 
“A PLA Cyber ‘Rules of the Road’ Proposal,” OE Watch 3, no. 7 (July 2013): 48, 
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201307/201307.pdf; Bill Gertz, “NSA Details Chinese Cyber 
Theft of F-35, Military Secrets,” Washington Beacon, January 22, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-
security/nsa-details-chinese-cyber-theft-of-f-35-military-secrets/; Michael Joseph Gross, “Enter the Cyber-
dragon,” Vanity Fair, September 2011, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109. 
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trend of Chinese cyber operations. Global anxiety over the PRC’s cyber tactics and 
language outlined in its forward-leaning Defense White Papers bring forth the importance 
of interpreting China’s cyber methodology.21 A better understanding of the motivations 
behind PRC cyber espionage and its relationship with the PLA’s modernization is crucial; 
this thesis addresses those general questions and anticipates the broad international 
implications of China’s cyberspace behavior.22 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The debates in the literature that address China’s cyber strategy, PLA cyber 
methods, and rapid PLA modernization span across a range of intricate, rapidly evolving 
cyber and technological discussions. What is China’s current cyber strategy? Does China 
employ a coordinated or fragmented cyber strategy? Is China’s cyber strategy offensive, 
defensive, military-target focused, or private industry-focused, and why? These 
representative questions address key groups of literature topics that attempt to explain the 
reason for the PLA’s accelerated modernization, China’s increased virtual presence, and 
the growth in frequency of Chinese cyberattacks on foreign targets. Additionally, these 
questions are used to help distinguish the categories of debates in the literature in this 
section. 
Despite the contributions these publications make toward explaining China’s 
cyber actions and the course of PLA modernization, there is not enough unclassified 
literature devoted to exploring how China’s cyber espionage directly relates to PLA 
modernization: specifically, the degree to which cyber exploitation assists the military’s 
advancement. Of the literature on both PLA modernization and cyber warfare published 
since the late 1990s, many scholars try to interpret China’s strategic thinking on both: Is 
                                                 
21 “Document: China’s Military Strategy.”  
22 Thomas et al., “PLA Cyber ‘Rules of Road,’” 48. 
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it offensive, defensive, or a combination of the two?23 This group of authors is broken up 
into two categories: U.S. and Western scholars who argue China’s cyber strategy is 
oriented in an offensive manner, and Chinese scholars who argue the strategy is a 
defensive, modernized version of traditional warfare—similar to developed cyber 
strategies employed throughout the world.  
U.S. Army analyst Timothy L. Thomas and James C. Mulvenon, Director for the 
Center of Intelligence Research and Analysis (CIRA) at the Defense Group Inc. (DGI), 
are two key authors who are representative of the majority of studies on China’s modern 
cyber strategy from U.S. and Western perspectives. Western perspectives often reference 
the “cult of the offensive,”24 because they advocate that China’s cyber strategy is 
offensive in nature, and the only way for the United States to combat that strategy is with 
a similarly aggressive stance.25 Other key contributors to this literature include U.S. 
government, defense, and news reports. These reports argue that China’s cyber strategy is 
                                                 
23 Allen A. Friedman, “Cyber Theft of Competitive Data: Asking the Right Questions,” Center for 
Technology Innovation, Brookings Institute (September 2013), 1, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
research/files/papers/2013/09/25-cyber-theft-competitive-data-friedman/brookingscybertech_revised.pdf; 
James Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations, and 
Capability,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and 
Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 257–58; Kevin Pollpeter, “Chinese 
Writings on Cyberwarfare and Coercion,” in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in 
the Digital Domain, ed. Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 141. 
24 P.W. Singer and Allen Friedman, “Cult of the Cyber Offensive: Why belief in the First-Strike 
Advantage is as Misguided Today as it was in 1914,” Foreign Policy, last modified January 15, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/15/cult-of-the-cyber-offensive/ 
25 Heginbotham et al., U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 273; Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network 
Operations,” 258–59. 
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also offense-oriented and use the case of one PLA unit’s cyber compromise of more than 
140 Western targets over seven years as supporting evidence.26 
Mulvenon and Thomas represent a group of authors who address China’s 
increased cyber theft of sensitive technology with respect to its impact on PLA 
modernization.27 Thomas and Mulvenon provide detailed explanations of current 
Chinese cyber operations, and the factors that influence China’s stance on cyber warfare 
to describe why China’s strategy is aggressive and offense-centric.28 Their works 
(through analyses of Chinese language sources) provide useful descriptions of current 
PLA cyber operations and cyber terminology to clearly outline the parameters of China’s 
cyber strategy.29 Ultimately, Thomas and Mulvenon’s literature describe the nature of 
China’s grand cyber strategy, why China employs certain cyber methods, and 
                                                 
26 “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant (February 2013), 2–4, 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com; Adam M. Segal, “Cyberspace: The New Strategic Realm in U.S.-China 
Relations,” Strategic Analysis 38, no.4 (2014): 577, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.918447; 
Gertz, “NSA Details Chinese Cyber Theft”; “Chinese Military Experts Slam U.S. Defence Report Alleging 
Cyber Attacks,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 8, 2013, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ 
hottopics/lnacademic/; James A. Lewis, “Five Myths about Chinese Hackers,” Washington Post, March 22, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-chinese-hackers/2013/03/22/4aa07a7e-
7f95-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html; Cyber Threats from China, Russia, and Iran: Protecting 
American Critical Infrastructure Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and 
Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1 
(2013), 11 (statement of Frank J. Cilluffo, Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George 
Washington University), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=755309; “China’s Cyber-theft Jet Fighter,” Wall 
Street Journal, November 12, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-cyber-theft-jet-fighter-
1415838777. 
27 Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 253–54; James Mulvenon, interview by Ray 
Suarez, “U.S. Government, Industry Fed up with Chinese Cyber Theft; What’s Being Done?” PBS News 
Hour, July 8, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military-july-dec13-cybercrime_07-08/; Mark A. 
Stokes and L.C. Russell Hsiao, Countering Chinese Cyber Operations: Opportunities and Challenges for 
U.S. Interests (Project 2049 Institute, October 29, 2012), 3–5, http://www.project2049.net/documents/ 
countering_chinese_cyber_operations_stokes_hsiao.pdf. 
28 Richard Parker, “Trojan Alert! It’s Not Just the Russians Who are Spying on America,” Nation 
(Thailand), July 6, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/; Adam Segal, 
Advantage: How American Innovation Can Overcome the Asian Challenge (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2011). 
29 Thomas, “China’s Cyber Incursions,” 2–5; Thomas, “China’s Concept of Military Strategy,” 41–43. 
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recommend effective counterstrategies.30 The two authors differ, however, in their 
methods of approach and conclusions.31 
Mulvenon makes his observations of China’s employment of current computer 
network operations (CNO) to argue that China’s cyber strategy is oriented in an 
offensive, aggressive manner because it seeks to both deter the U.S. and maintain a 
semblance of control over Taiwan. Mulvenon contends the best U.S. response is to 
cultivate a similarly aggressive, offense-centric cyber strategy.32 This thesis finds 
Mulvenon’s work helpful and relies on his detailed analyses of China’s modern CNO to 
engage in an accurate study of how China employs cyber espionage. 
In contrast, Thomas’s analyses interpret Chinese perspectives on military strategy 
and transfer that view over to China’s cyber operations to discuss the orientation and 
methods of China’s modern cyber strategy.33 Thomas uses case studies of China’s 
modern strategic cyber language as evidence to show the influence of Sun Zi’s historical 
principles on its cyber strategy: deception and obtaining a strategic advantage over the 
enemy through offense will help achieve victory.34 This thesis also finds Thomas’s work 
useful since he dissects China’s cyber strategy from a Chinese cultural perspective—
instead of relying on traditional Western views. Consequently, this thesis utilizes Thomas 
and Mulvenon’s works since they represent the majority of publications on China’s cyber 
strategy and approach the subject from a Chinese viewpoint. 
Thomas and Mulvenon’s discussions on China’s modern cyber operations and the 
nature of China’s cyber strategy are helpful for this thesis but lack the foundational 
information on the origins of that strategy. Hence, rather than enter their debate over 
whether China’s cyber strategy is inherently offensive or defensive, this thesis builds on 
                                                 
30 Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 280; Stokes and Hsiao, Countering Chinese 
Cyber Operations, 2–5; Thomas et al., “PLA Cyber ‘Rules of Road,’” 48. 
31 Thomas, “China’s Cyber Incursions,” 1–5; Thomas, “China’s Concept of Military Strategy,” 39–40; 
Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 253–54. 
32 Parker, “Trojan Alert”; Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 267, 279–80.   
33 Thomas, “China’s Cyber Incursions,” 3–11; Timothy L. Thomas, “The Chinese Military’s Strategic 
Mind-set,” Military Review 87, no. 6 (November-December 2007): 47–49, 
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34 Thomas, “China’s Cyber Incursions,” 5–11.   
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their studies to establish the foundation for China’s cyber strategy and demonstrate how 
the PLA’s use of certain cyber methods—cyber espionage and CNE—fits into that 
strategy.35 In opposition to Thomas and Mulvenon’s work, the Chinese military and 
strategic cyber literature denies this view that China’s cyber strategy is primarily 
offensive in nature. 
Chinese-native language literature frequently disagrees with U.S. and Western 
perceptions that China’s cyber strategy is aggressive and offense-centric. Chinese authors 
argue that China’s cyber strategy is oriented in a defensive, cooperative, operational 
manner.36 “China’s Military Strategy,” as The Science of Military Strategy claims, “is to 
protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity, resist aggression and subversion 
from outside, and safeguard people’s labor in peace.”37 Chinese government, military, 
and media outlets frequently uphold the position that China is heavily victimized by CNE 
and cyberattacks, so the cyber intrusions it launches are part of its defense approach to 
cyber strategy.38 
This Chinese-native literature emphasizes China’s “Peaceful Development and 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” as evidence of China’s nonaggressive cyber 
intentions.39 China’s Defense White Papers maintain that China uses its developed cyber 
capabilities for its own peaceful development and in response to U.S. hacks on Chinese 
                                                 
35 Thomas, “China’s Cyber Incursions,”  1; Thomas, “China’s Concept of Military Strategy,” 39–40.  
36 Thomas, Hurst, Kim et al., “PLA Cyber ‘Rules of Road,’” 48. 
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nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/; Lindsay, “Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction,” 8, 44; 
Lewis, “Five Myths”; Austin, “What the U.S. Gets Wrong”; “China Ramps Up Public Cyber Security 
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networks.40 As another example, Chinese author Han Dongping directly disputes China’s 
so-called unlawful cyber acquisition of F-35 schematics by stating the United States 
repeatedly launches cyberattacks against PRC networks—as evident by the Edward 
Snowden-released information.41 While it is important to introduce Chinese literature 
that offers an alternate perspective to U.S. views and addresses the nature of China’s 
cyber strategy, the publications could have biased foundations for Chinese government 
purposes that do not accurately portray the nature of China’s cyber strategy. This thesis 
incorporates these Chinese perspectives to provide an accurate depiction of China’s 
modern strategic thought and Chinese views on the employment of cyber espionage. As 
previously mentioned, however, this thesis does seek to enter the debate on whether the 
orientation of China’s cyber strategy is offensive or defensive in nature.  
The next category of literature also examines China’s cyber strategy but takes a 
different approach to earlier debates to determine the quality of China’s cyber strategy 
compared to other nations: Is China’s cyber strategy coordinated and organized, or is it 
an unsystematic, ad hoc strategy?42 This group of literature does not discuss the 
historical, domestic, or international drivers that impact the orientation of China’s 
modern strategy. These publications operate under the key assumption that China has an 
established cyber strategy. On one side of this debate, publications contend that the 
CCP’s delegation of China’s cyber mission to the disorganized Chinese-state bureaucracy 
has left the implementation of China’s cyber strategy disjointed and fragmented.43 
Authors that evaluate China’s cyber strategy as underdeveloped, argue that 
Chinese cyber operations are too fragmented to pose a legitimate threat to U.S. national 
security. Authors in this debate substantiate their arguments through comparisons of U.S. 
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and Chinese cyberattacks: they argue that U.S. cyber capabilities are more sophisticated 
than the basic technical skills China employs.44 This literature also cites numerous 
domestic and territorial concerns China prioritizes over its cyber strategy to argue that 
those concerns prevent China from cultivating robust, sophisticated cyber capabilities 
that would severely damage U.S. networks.45 In particular, as an authoritarian regime, 
strict control over its population’s access to information is vital to the survival of the CCP 
at the top of the PRC state.46  Doing this, in turn, requires strict control over the Internet, 
which State Department and commercial actors promoting “open Internet” threatens.47  
These publications also argue that U.S. defense reports’ evaluations of China’s cyber 
strategy as developed, organized, and a threat to U.S. national security are inaccurate 
because of their lack of foundational evidence.48 
U.S. government- and defense-sponsored reports represent the alternate side of 
this debate because they maintain the perception that China possesses advanced cyber 
capabilities; they contend that their analyses are correct and even under-evaluated.49 U.S. 
security commission reports draw support for their claims from studies of wide-scale 
Chinese CNE operations: the Mandiant-reported information highlighting one PLA units’ 
largely undetected record of cyber intrusion operations of 141 targets from 2006–2013.50 
Defense reports also compare China’s ambiguous cyber capabilities with transparent U.S. 
cyber missions to make this point. These reports contend that China employs a high 
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degree of secrecy in their operations because their cyber capabilities are continually 
advancing.51  
Government- and defense-sponsored reports also conclude that China’s increased 
cyber espionage points to a larger trend: the cyber threat from China spans much wider 
than the United States knows.52 This thesis agrees with these studies that China does in 
fact employ a coherent, observable cyber strategy. This thesis also draws information 
from these studies to establish the foundation and parameters for China’s cyber strategy. 
This thesis does not, however, provide an evaluation on the quality of China’s cyber 
strategy. This thesis uses defense-reported information to establish the basis that China 
has a cyber strategy that employs cyber espionage but does not comment on whether that 
strategy employs advanced cyber capabilities or rudimentary technical skills. 
Broadening the scope of research, there is literature that examines Chinese cyber 
espionage operations in relation to U.S. national security and cybersecurity concerns.53 Is 
cyber espionage of U.S. military data or U.S. trade secrets more damaging to U.S. 
national security? This literature divides cyber espionage targets into categories and 
explores how CNE of each category impacts U.S. foreign policy decisions.54 These 
publications distinguish between military and economic cyber espionage to argue that the 
exploitation of certain targets is more damaging than others. While there is disagreement 
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on which category is more damaging to U.S. national security, both debates agree that 
increased Chinese cyber intrusion on U.S. networks is a concern the United States needs 
to mitigate.55 Defense reports cite the damage cyber espionage of U.S. military and 
defense information causes; scholarly articles and private industry publications list the 
impact industrial trade secret CNE has on U.S. national security. This thesis agrees with 
these publications’ categorical separation of cyber espionage targets and uses them to 
conduct a precise study of how cyber espionage fits in to PLA modernization. 
On one side of the debate, scholars Derek S. Reveron and Adam Segal, advocate 
that China’s cyber exploitation of U.S. private industries and intellectual property is a 
damaging, unsanctioned form of warfare.56 Publications in this debate argue that China 
focuses on using CNE to acquire key foreign industrial secrets and technologies because 
the economic information rapidly increases the rate at which China’s domestic economy 
grows, China’s outdated infrastructure improves, China’s global economic standing rises, 
and China’s economic edge over the United States increases.57  
In contrast, U.S. defense and military reports contend that the theft of military 
system designs is more damaging to U.S. national security.58 U.S. defense- and military-
sponsored reports agree with the premise that cyber espionage of U.S. trade secrets is 
damaging, but they place more weight on the damaging effects CNE has on modern 
military platforms.59 The reports list the PRC’s compromise of U.S. F-35 fighter 
technology and China’s subsequent tests of its strikingly similar J-31 fighter jet as cases 
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of indisputable evidence.60 These reports also expand their argument to comment on the 
rapid pace of China’s and the PLA’s development. 
Defense reports also make a key assumption that China’s elevated economic and 
advanced military development are products of Chinese cyber espionage.61 This thesis 
rejects that assumption because there is frequently no foundational evidence presented to 
support that claim. This thesis finds these publications’ distinction between military and 
economic CNE targets useful to discover trends in Chinese cyber espionage campaigns; 
however, the major goal of this study is to address the assumption that cyber espionage is 
the primary explanation for the PLA’s rapid modernization. This thesis also establishes 
the evidentiary basis for the role cyber espionage plays in accelerating PLA 
modernization. But this thesis does not evaluate which cyber espionage target category—
military or economic—is more damaging to U.S. national security.  
Another debate in the literature related to this thesis, discusses the effects China’s 
underdeveloped domestic innovation has on the PLA’s advancement.62 Tai Ming 
Cheung, Jon R. Lindsay, and Segal are key authors representing these publications. They 
investigate the connection between PLA modernization, increased Chinese cyber 
espionage, and indigenous Chinese innovative and R&D capacities.63 These publications 
surmise that China’s rudimentary domestic innovative capabilities force its dependence 
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on foreign technology acquisitions to modernize the PLA.64 These publications compare 
the high amount of China’s foreign technology acquisitions (whether through trade 
agreements, cyber espionage campaigns, traditional espionage operations, or reverse 
engineering) with its limited domestically produced innovative technology to support 
their argument. These publications assert that China’s accessibility to foreign technology 
through various procurement means has diminished its urgency to develop China’s 
private R&D industries and innovation-focused infrastructure.65 Ultimately, these reports 
advocate that China needs to develop domestic technological innovation rather than 
depend primarily on espionage to maintain a modernized military whose capabilities rival 
Western nations.66 
While the evidence in the above-referenced articles associates cyber espionage 
with PLA modernization, it does not provide a comprehensive description of how cyber 
espionage fits into the PLA’s advancement. The difference between this thesis’ focus and 
the domestic innovation publications is that the publications imply cyber espionage is one 
of several coping mechanisms the PLA uses to modernize its equipment. The articles do 
not discuss the role cyber espionage plays in advancing PLA modernization as this thesis 
does. This study finds the publications’ identification of China’s alternate procurement 
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methods for specific military technologies very useful and draws from their examples to 
support the research findings. This thesis also utilizes these examples to draw correlations 
between the frequency each method is used and to distinguish if one method is used more 
heavily than others. This thesis finds the description of China’s underdeveloped 
innovative capacities helpful, as a potential explanation: it suggests why the PLA 
employs CNE versus alternate procurement methods. This thesis does not discuss the 
finer details of China’s innovative capacity to recommend improvement areas. 
Taking an alternate approach to PLA modernization and Chinese cyber espionage, 
James A. Lewis, Strategic Technologies Director at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), represents a literature category that debates cyberspace 
definitions. Specifically, do China’s cyber operations warrant retaliation because they are 
defined as cyberattacks, or are they just employing benign virtual methods of traditional 
espionage? Lewis highlights U.S. government and military officials’ interchangeable use 
of “cyber espionage” and “cyberattack” to highlight his point: cyberattacks cause 
physical damage, so if China conducted cyberattacks on the United States—instead of 
cyber espionage—the United States could respond with kinetic force because those 
attacks would be considered virtual acts of war.67 Lewis also contends that while China 
sanctions cyber espionage on U.S. targets, virtual spying does not cause damage and is 
not tantamount to a cyberattack.68 
Lewis’s representative work establishes precise definitions of cyber warfare, 
cyberattacks, and cyber espionage, but does so to comment on the overall threat level 
Chinese hackers pose to U.S networks.69 Lewis defends his point by arguing that China 
would not instigate cyberattacks because China recognizes the U.S.’s virtual superiority 
and the importance of peacefully operating within existing international cyber norms.70 
This thesis draws directly from Lewis’s cyber definitions because they allow this study to 
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give a precise determination of how state-sponsored cyber espionage fits into PLA 
modernization. Lewis’s work is also helpful to this thesis because it identifies cases of 
Chinese cyber espionage that potentially assisted PLA modernization. 
Along similar lines, another group of scholars seeks to establish the standards for 
warfighting domains: Can China’s actions in the cyberspace be categorized as cyber 
warfare if virtual reality is not a warfighting domain?71 This group examines land, sea, 
air, and space domains in the context of wartime operations and discusses whether 
classifying cyberspace as a warfighting domain is plausible or unrealistic. U.S. 
government and DOD publications assert that cyberspace is a warfighting domain, while 
scholarly articles disagree.72 Martin C. Libicki is one author who argues against the idea 
that cyberspace is a legitimate domain for information warfare operations.73 Libicki 
concludes that while control over adversarial networks can disrupt communication 
channels and cause inconveniences to government operations, it does not constitute an act 
of war; therefore negating the claim that warfare can be conducted in cyberspace. Libicki 
supports his point by arguing that if cyberspace were a warfighting domain, then nations 
would respond to cyberattacks with kinetic strikes—but that has not happened.74  
Libicki also argues that physical control over another nations’ territory, as occurs 
in conventional warfighting domains, cannot be achieved through disruptive, data-
damaging cyber operations.75 But the important role of cyber espionage in China’s 
warfighting capacity established in this thesis challenges the judgment that “cyberspace is 
not a warfighting domain.”76 Cyber espionage employs the same concepts, principles, 
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and objectives as traditional espionage; the only variance is in the application method. 
Consequently, to engage in a more precise analysis of the major research question, this 
thesis treats cyber espionage is a form of warfare, and the domain it is conducted in 
(cyberspace) as a warfighting domain. 
Another category of literature examines China’s cyber ambiguity to discuss the 
feasibility of deterrence in cyberspace: Is the ambiguity in China’s cyber strategy China’s 
virtual method of deterrence against Western nations, or is deterrence in the virtual realm 
even possible?77 This thesis does not explore the intricacies of deterrence, in relation to 
the orientation of China’s cyber strategy; however, this thesis does present ideas from this 
literature to bolster the study’s interpretation of China’s strategic cyber principles 
(ambiguity, deception, denial, etc.). Within cyber deterrence literature, one category of 
authors argues that the secrecy surrounding China’s modern cyber strategy and military 
cyber operations is necessary for China to maintain standard military operations and 
deterrence against foreign adversaries.78 
In contrast to the first debate, another group of scholars contends that foreign 
adversaries cannot be deterred if they do not have an idea of the potential capabilities a 
nation employs: in essence giving their cyber capabilities a level of credibility that they 
could inflict significant damage on an adversary.79 Consequently, the ambiguity of 
Chinese cyber operations does not afford China a cyber-deterrent against adversarial 
nations because there are no indications of its true cyber capabilities. Scholars on this 
debate expand their argument to suggest the opaqueness of China’s cyber strategy is just 
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an inherent characteristic of the authoritarian Chinese communist government.80 
Additionally, within this literature, authors argue against cyber deterrence by highlighting 
the inherently ambiguous nature of the virtual domain. Authors contend that in order for 
nations to adequately deter other nations, they must have some idea of an adversary’s 
intentions and motivations. Due to cyberspace’s remote, disconnected nature, it disguises 
nations’ intentions and motivations, which makes cyber deterrence unfeasible.81  
The last group of literature broadly examines China’s increased cyber espionage 
and rapid PLA modernization in the context of international relations and power 
transition theories: Are China’s aggressive cyber intrusions indications for its future 
foreign policy objectives to overtake the United States as a world power? Or will China 
rise peacefully within existing international norms? Author Maria Hsia Chang notes, 
“The PLA is a growth industry, already the largest in the world in manpower.”82 There is 
no debate that China and the PLA’s physical power bases are growing.83 The extent of 
the PRC’s rise, the PLA’s long-term modernization strategy, China’s strategic cyber 
orientation, and the ensuing ripple effects on the international order, are contested areas 
among international relations (IR) scholars. 
This group of publications argues that China’s foreign policy intentions aim to 
aggressively rise as a world power and cites cases of Chinese government-sponsored 
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cyber espionage as evidence.84 Realists like John W. Mearsheimer express one view on 
China’s future international goals: China’s rise to power will be aggressive and 
accompanied with conflict—to include cyber conflict.85 Realists conclude that cyber 
espionage is an advantageous tool that gives China the edge in future power struggles. 
Additionally, realists argue that the increase in Chinese CNE and the PLA’s offensive 
cyber orientation clearly support their claims.86 Through the course of investigating the 
central research question, it is possible that evidence supporting certain IR theories may 
emerge and will subsequently be addressed in the conclusion.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In the last decade, numerous U.S. government- and DOD-sponsored reports have 
cited the overwhelming number of Chinese cyber espionage cases and the PLA’s 
simultaneous, rapid modernization as evidence that China is aggressively rising as an 
international power.87 These reports additionally outline the assumption that cyber 
espionage is the clear mechanism thrusting forward the PLA’s advancement. As the 
literature review details, however, there are many potential explanations for China’s 
aggressive CNE and cyber network attack (CNA): the forward leaning posture is because 
China’s cyber strategy is “death by 1,000 cuts,” so its high-volume aggressive attacks 
both damage U.S. power and increase China’s power base; China’s use of cyber 
espionage is not as damaging as U.S. reports suggest because China’s cyber strategy is 
fragmented and decentralized; and China relies on cyber espionage as a central pillar of 
its cyber strategy because its domestic R&D and innovation are underdeveloped.  
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This potential explanation challenges U.S. Economic and Security Review 
Commission reports, DOD reports on “Military and Security Developments” in China, 
and U.S. think tank reports that make the key assumption that cyber espionage is the 
driver behind PLA modernization. Those reports do not provide the basis for their 
assumptions, and this study provides evidence to the contrary. This thesis investigates the 
role cyber espionage and CNE plays in advancing PLA modernization efforts: Does it 
have a central, complementary, or limited role in driving PLA modernization forward?  
The resulting explanation from that question is that Chinese cyber espionage 
plays an observable role in PLA modernization. Its role, however, is complementary to 
other preexisting PLA acquisitions methods because China’s cyber capabilities are not 
developed to the level at which they could consistently return intricate system details on 
military designs. There are also noted cases of modernized PLA military equipment that 
were purchased or reverse engineered through indigenous R&D efforts that support this 
explanation. Furthermore, this thesis expands on the original hypothesis to suggest that 
cyber espionage is not a primary tool for PLA modernization objectives.  
To investigate this potential explanation, the research is presented in three phases. 
The first phase examines PLA modernization and how it progressed from 1978–2015; the 
second phase investigates China’s cyber strategy, Chinese cyber actors, and the nature of 
China’s cyber actions; and the third phase identifies specific examples of Chinese cyber 
espionage campaigns, and their potential connections to PLA modernization in order to 
determine how they are related. Additionally, the majority of this thesis’s research relies 
on a comparison of PLA and U.S. military data due to the countries’ similarity in size, 
cyber capabilities, and modern military functions.88 Apart from Russia, there is no other 
nation with a relatively similar size, phase of development, modern military equipment, 
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and cyber skills that would provide a useful comparison to China.89 As a result, this 
thesis uses case studies of Chinese cyber intrusions on U.S. systems. 
Since this thesis focuses on determining how government-sponsored cyber 
espionage fits into PLA modernization, the research and research findings differentiate 
between military cyber espionage and economic cyber espionage. Military cyber 
espionage, for the purpose of this thesis, refers to cyber espionage or virtual exploitation 
of military- and defense-related equipment, technology, or data.90 In contrast, economic 
espionage primarily refers to cyber theft of economic, industrial, private corporation, or 
individual intellectual property and technologies.91 This thesis concentrates on military 
cyber espionage. Throughout the course of the study, however, examples of economic 
espionage are cited as evidentiary support for this study’s findings.  
Comprehensively addressing how cyber espionage fits into PLA military 
modernization while relying exclusively on open-source information is a multifaceted 
challenge in the research. Historical, declassified government-accounts of military tactics 
in previous wars have been crucial for the insight they provide into countries’ military 
strategies. Detailed current and future military strategies, however, typically remain 
classified above general public release for several decades, and cyber strategy is no 
exception. The inherently secretive and unsanctioned manner in which cyber espionage is 
conducted suggests, if there is literature regarding China’s cyber espionage strategy, it 
will likely be several years before it is declassified for study.92 Due to the classification 
constraints on first-hand sources, this thesis relies heavily on secondary sources for 
research. Additionally, first-hand Chinese-native, sources are often produced with the 
added influence of China’s authoritarian conditions, which suggests their comparative 
value for this study would not be useful due to the high amount of propaganda they 
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contain. This study’s research findings could need modification if the Chinese 
government-released information this thesis relies on is also inaccurate as part of 
government deception campaigns to disrupt adversary operations.93 An additional 
limiting factor in this thesis is the language barrier. The author has limited knowledge 
and ability to translate Chinese language sources. Consequently, the thesis relies on 
translated Chinese works or scholarly secondary U.S. sources to provide the necessary 
information.94 
Due to the relatively new and rapid evolution of cybersecurity and cyber warfare 
methods, this thesis primarily references recent publications (published from 2010–
2015), to ensure the relevancy, accuracy, and timeliness of the information. Additionally, 
as a result of research design constrains, this thesis cites a majority of its research 
material through Annual Congressional Reports, think tank publications, Chinese 
Defense White Papers, and authors such as Lewis, Lindsay, Cheung, and Mulvenon.95 
This thesis also pulls quantitative data from recently published sources, to include 
Master’s theses and U.S. government websites, due to the information being the most up-
to-date.96 Since this thesis addresses hypotheses primarily using military and security 
language, the previously listed sources also best support that effort. To obtain a 
comprehensive picture of modern PLA cyber capabilities versus cyber espionage 
operations, this thesis uses U.S. and Chinese media articles, government reports, and 
international publications to compile the data. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
In order to investigate how government-sponsored cyber espionage fits into PLA 
modernization, this thesis triangulates three areas for discussion: the path of China’s 
cyber development throughout the course of PLA modernization, China’s cyber strategy, 
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and how China employs cyber espionage. Consequently, Chapter II of this thesis provides 
the definitions for key cyber terminology—cyber warfare, cyber espionage, and 
cyberattack—to foster a common, foundational understanding for the rest of the thesis. 
Chapter III establishes the basis for China’s cyber strategy by discussing PLA 
modernization in four distinct waves: this chapter outlines specific PLA modernization 
initiatives, developmental cyber programs, and the drivers behind them. 
Chapter III sets the foundation for Chapter IV, which details the organization, 
tenents, and modes of operation the PLA uses to operate China’s current CNO strategy. 
Chapter V gives an in-depth examination of case studies that detail historical Chinese 
cyber espionage operations, PLA acquisition methods, and developmental timelines of 
modernized PLA military equipment. Ultimately, Chapter VI discusses the implications 
Chinese cyber intrusions have on bilateral cyber agreements and discusses potential 
courses of action the United States could use to cultivate an appropriate counterstrategy. 
Finally, Chapter VI also presents avenues for future research that this thesis did not 
explore. 
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II. DEFINING KEY CYBER TERMS 
A. TRADITIONAL ESPIONAGE VERSUS CYBER ESPIONAGE  
The Oxford’s English Dictionary defines espionage as “the practice of spying or 
of using spies, typically by governments, to obtain political and military information.”97 
Nations have engaged in traditional espionage since the beginning of conventional 
warfare. Traditional espionage can be conducted physically by an agent of the 
government, a proxy, or a co-opted individual.98 Those individuals use any means 
necessary to acquire data, information, or state secrets for an external entity. A notable 
example from U.S. history was former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee 
Aldrich Ames who provided covert U.S. agent information to the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War.99 Espionage is split into categorical types like military, political, or economic.  
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) defines economic espionage as 
an individual consciously targeting, stealing, or acquiring trade secrets to intentionally 
aid a foreign individual, entity, or government.100 Since the creation of the U.S. 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA), of 1996, the United States prosecuted over 124 cases of 
economic espionage.101 One such example occurred over the course of 25 years: a 
Chinese-born citizen became an employee of the U.S. Aerospace Company Boeing and 
exfiltrated an enormous amount of technical data, schematics, and designs for U.S. 
military-contracted airframes back to China.102 Even though the espionage target was 
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military data, the case was considered economic because the individual targeted a private 
U.S. corporation’s trade secrets. While espionage is an offense punishable by death in 
many countries, it is not an act that can be used to initiate war. Studies of notable 
espionage cases in U.S. history have served to increase physical security measures, 
bolster background check requirements, proliferate employee training on espionage 
indicators, and make traditional espionage attempts more difficult. Consequently, a new, 
more accessible form of espionage has risen in the Information Age—cyber espionage. 
Due to its ease-of-use, variance of applications, anonymity, and degree of 
separation for its users, cyber espionage is a popular substitute for traditional 
espionage.103 Cyber espionage and traditional espionage have the same end goal: obtain, 
acquire, or steal information, data, or technology from a foreign entity to use the acquired 
information against the entity for personal, military, or economic gains. The difference in 
traditional and cyber espionage, however, comes down to practical application. Cyber 
espionage is conducted in the virtual domain using Internet, network, and cyber 
connections to acquire or steal critical information from foreign nations. 
In other words, cyber espionage, cyber intrusions, and cyber spying are all acts of 
an adversarial power (whether government-sanctioned, military, private, or terrorist), 
stealing or acquiring another country’s sensitive information, technology, or trade secrets 
through cyber means.104 In contrast to traditional espionage, cyber espionage can be 
state-sponsored or conducted by individual actors, hacker groups, or private corporations 
with non-state-aligned goals. For example, China’s non-government hacktivists conduct 
cyber espionage against domestic targets, foreign governments, military networks, and 
private businesses to benefit their personal and national objectives.105  
Cyber espionage has brought about a new sense of fear in many nations across the 
world because of the inherent ambiguity of adversarial intentions, difficulty of 
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attribution, and lack of legal framework to prosecute suspected cyber criminals.106 With 
traditional espionage, if a spy is captured, there is an individual and often a host-nation to 
hold accountable. With cyber espionage, however, that is not always the case. Cyber 
hackers can conduct cyber espionage from any location outside of the targeted cyber 
objective. Skilled hackers can disguise their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to prevent a 
targeted entity from attributing the attack to them or from discovering their location. 
The high degree of anonymity in the virtual realm also increases the motivation 
for governments to conduct cyber espionage, because states cannot prosecute offenders 
without physical evidence and developed legal standards. An example demonstrating this 
point was the U.S. DOJ’s indictment of five PLA officers for conducting CNE on U.S. 
industrial targets.107 The PLA officers conducted the cyber intrusions outside the United 
States and were not extradited to the United States by China.108 Similar to traditional 
espionage, cyber espionage can be broken down into different target categories. 
In contrast to the United States, China has traditionally not acknowledged 
separate categories of cyber espionage targets. Cyber analyses have cultivated a common 
view on China, based on numerous government, defense, and media reports of increasing 
Chinese CNE on U.S. military, economic, and government targets without regard for 
economic sanctions or political blowback: that China views all data and information 
(whether military, political, or industrial) obtained from cyber espionage campaigns as 
acceptable and sanctioned targets under modern cyber warfare.109 China does not have a 
similar record as the United States of upholding individual intellectual or private property 
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rights because the majority of public holdings are state-owned.110 The United States 
distinguishes between categories of cyber espionage targets, however, because it has a 
history of protecting U.S. citizen and private industry intellectual property rights.111 
Military cyber espionage exploits military applications, equipment schematics, personnel 
data, or strategic doctrines; economic cyber espionage targets private citizen, corporate, 
or intellectual property; political espionage manipulates government personnel, data, and 
operations information.112 U.S. private industries make up a significant portion of the 
U.S.’s economic activity; increased cyber exploitation of their trade secrets has lowered 
the United States’ overall domestic profits.113 For this reason, the United States 
condemns economic espionage attacks and uses the EEA to indict individuals who 
commit economic cyber espionage.114 This thesis distinguishes between military, 
economic, and political cyber espionage but primarily examines the effects of military 
cyber espionage under the umbrella of cyber warfare. 
B. UNDER CYBER WARFARE’S UMBRELLA: COMPARING THE 
SPECTRUM OF CYBER APPLICATIONS 
CSIS cyber expert James A. Lewis takes a firm stance on the differences between 
definitions of cyber espionage and cyberattacks, “China has not used force against the 
United States in cyberspace. What it has been doing is spying. And spying, cyber or 
otherwise, is not an attack or grounds for war.”115 This thesis takes a similar stance on 
Lewis’s judgement toward the difference between cyber espionage and cyberattack. As 
Lewis suggests, however, cyber terms—cyber warfare, cyberattack, cyber espionage, and 
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cybersecurity—are used interchangeably in popular discourse, but the terms occupy 
different ends of the spectrum under cyber warfare.116 
Cyber warfare is an important term to distinguish because it encompasses all 
exploitive cyber activities: cyber espionage, computer hackings, cyberattacks, computer 
network intrusions, information operations, and information deception.117 Cyber warfare 
is a virtual method of warfighting that relies of cyber tools to carry out wartime or state 
objectives against an adversarial power. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff define cyber 
warfare as, “An armed conflict conducted in whole or in part by cyber means.”118 Even 
though “armed conflict” is designated as a criteria of cyber warfare, the parameters for 
cyberattacks that would constitute “armed” cyber conflicts are not defined. 
The United States frequently categorizes Chinese cyber espionage or cyberattacks 
on U.S. networks as punishable crimes, not warfare. For example, the United States 
attributed several CNE campaigns on U.S. industries to five PLA officers and pursued 
criminal indictments for them rather than taking military action against China.119 
Analyses on the subject suggest the United States employs that specific definition of 
cyberattack in order to avoid entering retaliatory conflicts.120 This thesis, however, does 
not use “armed conflict” as a measure for cyber warfare. Cyber warfare is used as a term 
to discuss the range of exploitive cyber methods and applications employed by 
government or non-government entities to achieve a desired outcome. The key word in 
this definition is “exploitive.” For this thesis, exploitation (in regards to cyber espionage) 
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refers to the unwilling, unknowing, and unauthorized targeting and subsequent 
exfiltration of objectives, information, or data by a hacker using cyber warfare means. 
Within the range of activities included under cyber warfare (listed in the U.S. 
Cyber Command’s Cyber Warfare Spectrum in Figure 1), cyber espionage is considered 
a benign intrusion and cyberattacks are considered kinetic strikes.121 In this thesis, both 
cyberattacks and cyber espionage are considered subsets of cyber warfare operations. 
Figure 1.  The Spectrum of Cyber Warfare with Historical Examples 
Demonstrating the Range and Effectiveness of Cyber Activities 
 
Source: “U.S. Cyber Command Presentation: Assessing Actions along the Spectrum of 
Cyberspace Operations,” Public Intelligence, last modified August 26, 2013, 
https://publicintelligence.net/uscc-cyber-spectrum/.  
Cyberattacks are the intentional use of networks, cyber applications, or malware 
to disrupt, deny, or physically harm to another individual’s, entity’s, or government’s 
networks, servers, or cyber operations.122 Cyberattacks can be singular, annoying 
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instances like credit card, banking, or personal information theft; they can also be long-
term malware attacks that are devastating to a foreign entity’s electronics.123  
Cyberattacks are distinguished by their severity and damage they cause to a 
target.124 Since this thesis uses “exploitive” to define cyber warfare applications, 
cluttered annoyances like Spam emails do not exploit a target and therefore are not 
considered cyber warfare. Cyber intrusions, cyber espionage, and data exfiltration are on 
the lower, benign level of cyber warfare.125 Cyber disruption—distributed denial of 
service (DDOS) or spearphishing—are mid-level cyber warfare operations.126 CNA—
like the Stuxnet computer virus—is on the higher level of cyber warfare.127 In this thesis, 
cyberattacks refers to both cyber disruption and severely damaging attacks. Apart from 
distinguishing cyber tools’ severity, it is also crucial, when referencing China’s CNE, to 
differentiate between the actors that employ those applications.  
C. CATEGORIZATIONS OF CYBER ACTORS: HACKER GROUPS AND 
INDIVIDUALS 
1. Advanced Persistent Threats 
In 2006, the U.S. Air Force coined the term “advanced persistent threat” (APT) to 
categorize suspected Chinese hacking groups that targeted U.S. servers.128 Since cyber 
hacking proliferated across international borders, APT’s meaning has also expanded 
across the world. APT now refers to any state or non-state sponsored hacking groups that 
have established records of exploitive, large-scale cyberattacks against particular 
targets—whether from Russia, China, or the United States.129 Hacking groups are also 
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categorized as APTs when they employ developed, tailored malware coding in their 
cyberattacks that allows them to exploit a specific objective.130 In 2013, Mandiant 
produced a cyber threat report that named Chinese PLA Unit 61398 (also known as the 
Comment Crew) as APT 1 based on its record of cyberattacks conducted against Western 
countries over several years.131 Apart from non-state organized hacking groups, small 
paramilitary hacking organizations also play a role in cyber warfare operations. 
2. Cyber and Information Warfare Militias 
Standard military and cyber militias are formal, specialized, civilian-integrated 
units that are unique to the PLA and to China.132 These contrast to the ad hoc, informal, 
non-military-affiliated reputation U.S. militias have had historically. The PLA is reliant 
on militias to supplement its general military functions.133 Chinese militias operate under 
the PLA’s command.134 The militias are comprised of non-military volunteers and 
citizens in order to integrate the Chinese people into PLA affairs.135 Additionally, militia 
members bolster PLA cyber, R&D, commercial, and educational development areas 
because a majority of the militia’s civilians are recruited from private institutions.136 
PLA militias are further distinguished by their mission sets: “ordinary and primary.”137 
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Ordinary units augment general military operations (administration and 
communications); primary militias have specialized functions like the PLA’s cyber; 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and information warfare 
operations.138 PLA cyber militias assist the PLA with conducting CNO, but specifically 
engage in cyber espionage, hacking, and cyberattacks. Since PLA cyber militias are 
primarily composed of non-military civilians, militia members maintain access to cutting-
edge government and non-government malware, cyber warfare applications, and cyber 
hackers.139 This thesis highlights the PLA’s cyber militias to demonstrate the range of 
actors that contribute to China’s government and non-government-sanctioned cyber 
espionage. Chinese underground hackers are additional cyber actors that must be 
distinguished because of their elevated presence in China and the virtual domain. 
3. The Underground Hacking Economy 
China’s “underground hacking economy”140 refers to unsanctioned cyber actions 
undertaken in secret by non-government entities for personal gain; it also references 
underground hacking’s mass proliferation and profitability across China.141 Since 
underground hackers are often unendorsed by the government, the individuals are 
considered cyber criminals; however, the Chinese government occasionally recruits 
underground hackers to bolster the PLA’s cyber forces.142 Hackers associated with 
China’s underground hacking conduct CNA against government, military, and corporate 
objectives. Underground hackers (or “black hat hackers”) do not all maintain a standard 
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level of capabilities because they utilize whatever means they can access.143 
Underground hackers are not always the perpetrators of cyberattacks: some exclusively 
design CNA malware, viruses, or coding and sell them to other hackers.144 Since China’s 
underground hacking has rapidly expanded, it is likely that underground entities also 
have a contribution to China’s CNE—whether sanctioned or not. Apart from various 
hacking group terms, there are also terms that distinguish individual hackers. 
4. Individual Hackers as Hactivists, Patriotic Hackers, White-Hat 
Hackers, and Cyberterrorists 
Hactivists, patriotic hackers, white-hat hackers, and cyberterrorists are types of 
non-government and government-sanctioned individual hackers. Hactivist is a general 
term that describes hackers who—absent of government or military pressure—conduct 
cyber operations for their own utility, personal motivations, or political biases.145 
Hactivists choose their targets (sometimes at random) primarily based on their own 
preferences.146 The next two terms (patriotic hackers and white-hat hackers) are 
considered types of hactivists because of the personal motivations that drive their cyber 
operations. The difference in the two lies in their employer. 
Patriotic hackers (“netizens” in China) are hactivists attributed to a specific 
nation.147 Patriotic hackers are typically not formally associated governments but can be 
government-employed. The primary motivation driving patriotic hackers is 
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nationalism.148 Consequently, patriotic hackers’ cyber targets are chosen based on their 
correlation to national security and development objectives. At times, these hackers’ 
extreme nationalism drives them to conduct retaliatory cyberattacks against nations that 
threaten their home country’s security.149 An example of a patriotic hacking was the high 
volume Chinese government and non-government cyberattacks on U.S. and Taiwanese 
government servers following the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 2004.150 Apart from patriotic 
hackers, there is also a designator for government-sponsored hackers.  
“White-hat” hackers are so named because of their affiliation with a specific 
national government. In contrast to underground, non-sanctioned “black-hat” hackers, 
white-hat hackers are government employees who conduct government-sanctioned cyber 
operations.151 White-hat hackers can be military, bureaucratic, or government-employed. 
Similar to patriotic hackers, white-hat hackers’ targets are in line with domestic 
government, military, and national security objectives. Specific motivational themes do 
not necessarily drive their cyber operations because the government directs them. In 
China, white-hat hackers are frequently used to assist domestic cybersecurity, bolster 
information censorship controls, and combat hactivists targeting China’s networks.152 
The last form of individual hackers—cyberterrorists—are similar to traditional 
terrorists but employ cyber applications to accomplish their objectives. Lewis defines 
cyberterrorism as, “the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national 
infrastructures…or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population.”153 
Cyberterrorists are motivated by religious or ideological purposes and conduct 
cyberattacks to recruit for their organizations and spread propaganda.154 This thesis does 
not touch on cyberterrorism, but cyberterrorists are important to distinguish because of 
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their prominence on global networks. Of the various types of hackers noted in this 
section, China routinely employs patriotic hackers to assist with PLA modernization and 
informationization goals. Since China’s cyber strategy is largely modeled around the core 
tenet of “informationization,” it is also crucial to define this term for this study. 
D. INFORMATIONIZATION 
“Informationization” and “informationized” are terms widely used by the CCP 
and to describe China’s transition into a modern technologically capable country. 
“Informationization” references the incorporation of communications and information 
technology (IT) equipment into the domain that it concerns.155 For example, if a report 
discusses the informationization of public education, it signifies the integration of 
communication and IT into public education sectors. The term does not just represent 
physical equipment: it also represents the technical skills and expertise needed to operate 
that equipment.156 Informationization is not exclusive to military, government, or 
bureaucratic domains. It can be (and has been) used to reference developmental 
objectives in Chinese economic, education, business, and corporate enterprise domains as 
well.157 An example that demonstrates this definition is when the CCP announces that it 
will informationize its military forces as part of PLA modernization. This statement 
means the CCP aims to equip the PLA with high-tech military weapons, advanced cyber 
capabilities, and modern technical training.158 In order to determine the role cyber 
warfare and cyber actors play in PLA modernization, the next chapter discusses how PLA 
modernization and China’s cyber missions have progressed since 1978.  
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III. PLA MODERNIZATION MEETS INFORMATIONIZATION 
Since 1978, domestic and international events have affected the scope, pace, and 
focus of PLA modernization; these events guided the PLA away from its traditional focus 
on conventional forces, toward informationized military branches. China’s responses to 
internal and external incidents are observable through specific time periods and waves of 
the PLA’s development. The first wave of modernization occurred from 1978–1988; the 
second wave followed from 1989–1996; the third wave happened in 1997–2003; and the 
fourth wave occurred from 2004–2015. Each wave demonstrated unique fundamental 
shifts in the CCP’s and PLA’s strategic thinking, national priorities, and postures toward 
the international community. The PLA modernization periods built upon each other to 
transform the PLA from an underdeveloped military into a semi-modern force.159 This 
chapter discusses the path of development for China’s modern cyber strategy and also 
shows China’s establishment of distinct cyber missions—like cyber espionage. This 
chapter establishes the foundation for China’s cyber strategy (discussed in Chapter IV). 
This chapter’s examination of modernization initiatives during key time periods—to 
include fielding a modern cyber strategy—also highlights the correlation between 
China’s introduction of modern military applications and increased CNO. 
A. THE FIRST WAVE: PLA MODERNIZATION FROM 1978–1988 
The years 1978–1988 saw the initial wave of PLA modernization that introduced 
important foundational concepts that future modernization waves built upon: 
technological acquisitions processes, conventional force reductions, technical skill and 
professional development training, and an indigenous R&D platforms for military 
technologies.160 In 1978, Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping agreed PLA modernization 
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was critical, but prioritized it beneath China’s domestic economic development.161 From 
1978–1988, Deng made significant cuts to the PLA’s conventional force numbers and 
reduced the PLA’s spending by approximately four percent of China’s gross domestic 
product (GDP).162 Deng’s decreased emphasis on the military and the military’s reduced 
budget actually became an advantage to the PLA in its modernization endeavors: the 
PLA had to develop a cost-effective, robust acquisitions system to update the military and 
supplement its previous government assistance.163  
The early PLA modernization initiatives of the 1970s that stressed force 
restructuring, indigenous R&D development, and military training reform, continued into 
the 1980s.164 Initial modernization efforts not only assembled a leaner, cost-effective 
force but also created an autonomous, business-like atmosphere in the PLA.165 In order 
for the PLA to follow the CCP’s orders and modernize amidst its second-hand 
prioritization, it had to join China’s economic vigor and become an independent player in 
China’s economy. The PLA’s self-sufficient, new economic role kept its advancement on 
par with China’s rapid economic growth until the late 1980s.166 From 1985–1990, 
however, the PLA’s modernization slowed. There were key events from 1989–1996 that 
revived the CCP’s urgency to modernize the military at a rapid rate: these events 
highlighted the PLA’s inferiority and underdevelopment force—compared to nations 
across the world.  
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B. THE SECOND WAVE: PLA MODERNIZATION FROM 1989–1996 
The second wave of PLA modernization from 1989–1996 was significant because 
its international events shifted the CCP’s priorities from economic-based to dual military- 
and economic-focused. The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989, the Gulf War in 1991, and 
the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996 were critical events that reasserted PLA modernization 
as a central pillar in China’s developmental agenda.167 In the second wave, there was also 
a noticeable change in PLA doctrines: military strategy shifted from conventional land 
battles to informationizing warfighting. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–1991, 
deeply impacted PLA modernization because the Soviet Union offered China a great 
amount of assistance during its developmental decades. 
During periods in 1950–1980, the Soviet Union provided the PLA aid, training, 
and technical advisement.168 The CCP knew it could request military assistance from the 
Soviet Union at any time, so there was no urgency to modernize while China had the 
Soviet Union as a key resource.169 The Soviet Union’s dismantlement ended that type of 
CCP thought. The Soviet collapse introduced an insecurity to the CCP that foreign 
assistance had been a crutch for the PLA. The PLA’s overreliance on Soviet assistance 
had left its forces underdeveloped. The CCP also believed that its communist rule could 
just as easily be overturned (like the Soviets) if the party did not strengthen its standing in 
the international community with a strong military force.170 The Gulf War only added to 
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the CCP’s insecurities. The United States’ weaponry in the Gulf War demonstrated just 
how technologically inferior the PLA was compared to advanced Western militaries.171 
In the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. military’s technology, interventionism, and 
immediate defeat of Saddam’s large conventional force were factors that caused 
significant concern for the CCP. One example of superior U.S. military technology in 
Iraq was the United States’ preemptive installation of malware programs onto Iraqi air-
defense systems prior to the war’s outbreak.172 After the war began, the United States 
triggered the malware allowing the U.S. military to bypass Iraq’s malfunctioning air-
defense system and defeat Iraqi troops.173 The CCP also perceived the U.S.’s decisive 
defeat of Saddam’s army as a warning that the U.S. military could do the same to the 
PLA.174 The PLA had not yet encountered exploitive cyber warfare applications like the 
United States used in Iraq. Consequently, the PLA had no modern cyber defenses against 
the United States if it did go to war with China. The U.S. military’s cyber tactics in the 
Gulf War accentuated the PLA’s technological inferiority to the United States. The Gulf 
War also highlighted the cyber warfighting capabilities the PLA needed to develop. As a 
result, the CCP put pressure on the PLA to rapidly modernize its technological skills, 
which would decrease its vulnerability to cyberattacks.175  
In response to the Gulf War, the CCP and PLA made outwardly visible changes 
that showed their shift in focus from conventional forces to modernized capabilities. In 
1994, the CCP allowed the Internet into China, and sanctioned public Internet access in 
1996.176 The Internet’s vast store of information had the ability to erode the CCP’s 
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single-party rule but modern technology development and electronic integration in the 
military became more important. Additionally, in 1995, Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin 
introduced a key doctrinal shift in the PLA’s warfighting strategy, which is still used with 
minor variation in modern PLA writings: the PLA must prepare “to fight and win local 
wars under modern, high-tech conditions.”177 Jiang’s doctrinal guidance necessitated that 
the PLA develop information warfare strategies—like those used by the United States in 
the Gulf War.178 Those initial developments also thrust forward the rapid development of 
domestic Internet censorship, which added further complexity to PLA modernization.179  
The Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996 was arguably the most influential event in the 
second wave because it invigorated the CCP’s urgency to modernize the military. The 
crisis also emphasized the U.S.’s global reach, willingness to intervene in international 
affairs, and superior technological capabilities.180 Since 1949, the CCP has viewed 
political reunification with Taiwan and Taiwanese dissidence as top domestic issues.181 
The Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996 also fell under that category. Taiwan pursued 
independent elections, which complicated its diplomatic situation with mainland 
China.182 China sought to unilaterally prevent this signal of Taiwanese dissidence by 
intervening with the PLAN.183 The United States, however, previously guaranteed 
Taiwan protection against Chinese aggression and used U.S. naval forces to intervene in 
the conflict.184 China’s naval capabilities (specifically ballistic missile technology) could 
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not compete with that of the United States.185 Consequently, the CCP could not discredit 
U.S. naval forces and unilaterally handle an event it viewed as a domestic priority—
Taiwan. The crisis demonstrated to China and the rest of the world how underdeveloped 
the PLA was—causing the CCP to emphasize multifaceted military, economic, and 
technological development, versus its previous economic-focused initiatives.186  
During the second wave, the CCP also made minor strides in physical 
implementation of PLA modernization. These strides reemphasized early modernization 
themes of reduced force numbers, rapid development, and advanced technologies.187 The 
CCP’s Information Office also created the strategic parameters for what would be the 
PLA’s modern cyber strategy.188 In addition, the PLA’s defense budget rose from one 
percent to 1.3 percent of China’s annual GDP.189 The PLA also introduced joint-branch 
mission execution strategies to supplement lacking technological capabilities in any 
force. The release of joint mission doctrines was a key development because it moved the 
PLA away from its traditional, compartmentalized top-down organization.190 The 
international events that occurred during the second wave accelerated the PLA’s 
development of modern military technology and robust cyber warfighting capabilities 
because China needed defenses against the U.S.’s superior technology. 
C. THE THIRD WAVE: PLA MODERNIZATION FROM 1997–2003 
The third wave was a critical period for the PLA’s rapid modernization strategies, 
robust acquisition methods, and initial cyber strategy because these initiatives were the 
CCP’s solution to PLA vulnerabilities exposed during the second wave.191 In contrast to 
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the first and second waves, the third wave had a wider span of modernization 
implementation across the entire PLA. This section divides third wave developments into 
categorical types to discuss the PLA’s transition into an informationized force. 
1. Defense White Papers as Doctrinal Guidance for PLA Modernization 
The release of China’s biannual Defense White Papers (DWP) in 1998 was the 
first indication to the international community that the CCP adopted modern strategic 
thought.192 Even though the white papers do not provide details on PLA missions, the 
papers give insight into China’s national defense goals, the CCP’s international priorities, 
and the PLA’s path of advancement.193 In the 1998 white papers, the CCP introduced the 
PLA’s “active defense” strategy.194 The strategy asserts that the PLA will use R&D and 
acquisitions to cultivate a technically skilled force that can accomplish two core 
objectives: be able to retaliate against enemies that attack China first and use a first-strike 
policy to gain an advantage over enemies.195 The Active Defense Strategy appeared to be 
a subtle response to the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996. It also acted as a notification to 
foreign naval forces in the Pacific that China would assert control over the South China 
Sea.196 The DWPs demonstrated the CCP’s commitment to reinforce PLA modernization 
efforts. Additionally, much like the second wave of PLA modernization, there were key 
events that fueled the development of other PLA initiatives during the third wave. 
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2. International Events Thrusting forward Modernization Efforts 
The 1999 U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing 
campaign in Yugoslavia, and the 2001 EP-3 aircraft collision were key third wave events 
that affected PLA modernization because they reinforced the CCP’s decision to rapidly 
develop PLA cyber capabilities.197 In 1999, the United States unintentionally bombed a 
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade—using precision-guided bombs—during NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia.198 This event fueled the CCP’s insecurities (much like the 
Gulf War and U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Straits Crisis) that the United States would 
continually undermine the CCP’s authority.199 In response to the incident, Chinese 
government, military, and individual hackers conducted high volume, overlapping cyber 
intrusions on U.S. and NATO networks.200 The retaliatory nature of the cyber operations 
highlighted the PLA’s implementation of its modern strategic guidance, and the PLA’s 
experimentation with modern information warfighting operations. 
In 2001, the collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft into a Chinese fighter 
jet was another event that thrust forward the physical development of all PLA branch 
missions—to include cyber.201 This incident was critical to PLA modernization because 
it demonstrated the PLA’s inferior cyber capabilities in relation to that of the U.S. 
military. In response to the EP-3 crash, Chinese hackers again flooded U.S. government 
networks; the difference in this situation, however, was that the United States conducted 
retaliatory cyber intrusions.202 The CCP and the PLA recognized the U.S.’s superior 
technical skills and molded their modern cyber strategy to defend against it. The PLA 
would use inferior cyber means with a modern cyber strategy, cyber espionage, and ISR 
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to overcome U.S. superiority in the virtual domain.203 To bolster PLA defenses against 
future cyber confrontations, China’s Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) also adopted a 
forward-leaning stance toward advancing the PLA’s cyber capabilities. 
3. Adopting a Modern Chinese Cyber Strategy 
a. The Chinese Academy of Military Sciences’ Cyber Experimentation 
During the third wave, AMS researched and established the foundation for 
China’s cyber strategy and cyber operations.204 AMS is China’s premier military 
institution, responsible for cutting-edge research on emerging strategic trends and 
military operations.205 The shift in relative emphasis AMS research from conventional to 
cyber strategies also demonstrated the spread of modernized strategic thinking throughout 
the PLA. Prior to 1999, AMS military experts used their studies on Western military 
cyber operations to theorize about potential Chinese cyber strategies. After 1999, 
however, AMS began to put those theories into practice by testing CNA methods under 
China’s Information Warfare doctrine.206 AMS expanded its research to field-test 
military cyber units for the PLA.207 Additionally, from 1999–2000, AMS simultaneously 
introduced government-sponsored cyber hackers and integrated civilian cyber militias to 
conduct a range of internal and external cyber missions.208 AMS’s experimentation was 
critical because the PLA’s continues to employ similar entities with overlapping cyber 
missions as part of China’s modern cyber strategy. 
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AMS’s cyber research efforts even progressed the PLA’s personnel recruitment 
methods.209 Once AMS’s initial testing and cyber application research was complete, 
AMS recommended that the PLA recruit technically capable, computer-savvy individuals 
from Chinese universities.210 These individuals filled the fundamental positions for the 
PLA’s modern cyber strategy and pioneered the use of modernized cyber tactics (cyber 
espionage and cyberattack) in the PLA.211 By 2001–2002, the first reports emerged 
detailing Chinese cyberattacks against U.S. government servers, Chinese dissidence 
organizations, neighboring East Asian countries, and Tibetan networks.212 Available 
information on early Chinese cyber intrusions suggests the targets were pursued primarily 
for political and national security purposes; however, that does not discount the notion 
that the obtained information could have also been used to supplement PLA 
modernization efforts.213 The enormous strides the PLA made to cultivate modern cyber 
warfare abilities demonstrated the PLA’s transition from a conventional-focused military 
to an informationized force.214 
b. Document 27 Emerges as the Blueprint for China’s Cyber Strategy 
In 2003, China made a noticeable move to solidify its strategic views on cyber by 
publishing “Document 27” (also known as the State Informationization Leading Group 
[SILG] 2003 Opinion document).215 Document 27 was China’s first formal strategic 
cyber document and is still used today.216 Document 27 is the blueprint for China’s 
cybersecurity and provides the parameters for China’s cyber strategy, cybercrime 
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investigations, and the Multilevel Protection Scheme (MLPS) for critical 
infrastructure.217 Since Document 27’s release, the SILG has not published a new 
cybersecurity documents, despite advancements in IT and the international environment: 
they only supplemented the document with policy updates that were responsive to 
national security issues or CCP priorities.218 In 2003, Document 27 was not fully 
developed (compared to similar documents in Western nations), but its emergence 
demonstrated the targeted cyber modernization efforts the PLA made in the third wave.  
4. Physical Modernization Developments 
Even though the third wave was primarily dedicated to modernizing the PLA’s 
warfighting strategies and cyber capabilities, there were still physical developments in the 
realm of informationized modernization that took effect. In 1997 and 2003 the PLA 
undertook massive personnel reductions to lower its conventional force numbers and 
create budgetary room for the PLA to refine its cyber and R&D platforms.219 In 1999, the 
PLA also began to exercise modern acquisitions methods: the PLA attempted to procure 
an Israeli Airborne Early Warning system (AEW).220 Consequently, the United States 
blocked the sale of the AEW to China, and the PLA used indigenous R&D to produce an 
AEW system.221 In 1999, China also opened procurement channels with Russia to 
acquire four destroyer ships that could fire long-range cruise missiles that depended on 
overcoming significant command and control (C2) and ISR challenges.222 The PLA’s 
attempts to purchase modern AEW and naval technology demonstrated its development 
of non-cyber acquisitions systems—which helped the PLA modernize its military 
equipment in the fourth wave 
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D. THE FOURTH WAVE: PLA MODERNIZATION FROM 2004–2015 
The fourth wave of PLA modernization was the rapid, multifaceted physical 
implementation phase for the PLA’s transition into a modern military force. By 2004, the 
PLA had already fielded a functional cyber mission, conducted successful cyber 
intrusions, and altered its strategic cyber warfare guidance to reflect the high-tech posture 
other militaries adopted around the world. Immediately in the beginning of the fourth 
wave, however, international events again served as an accelerant for the pace of the 
PLA’s equipment modernization initiatives. 
Similar to the previous waves of modernization, the fourth wave saw three 
international events simultaneously thrust forward PLA modernization and China’s 
robust cyber strategy. In 2004, another Taiwan Straits Crisis erupted with Taiwan’s 
introduction of independent elections.223 The CCP did not support Taiwan’s 
independence campaigns, or the U.S.’s diplomatic intervention that came with the 2004 
elections.224 As a result the CCP pushed forward PLAN technology, CNE, and military 
cyber intrusions to better prepare for any complications resulting from future Taiwanese 
independence demonstrations. Apart from the developments in the Taiwan Straits, the 
Stuxnet virus incident also had an effect on the course of PLA modernization.225  
The 2010 Stuxnet virus was critical for China (and the entire world) because it 
was the first demonstration of cyber warfare that could remotely inflict physical damage 
on another country.226 The Stuxnet virus impaired an entire Iranian uranium enrichment 
plant, which had not been done before.227 Similar to the malware the United States 
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employed during the Gulf War, the CCP viewed Stuxnet in the same manner. In contrast, 
however, by 2010, China built up cyber warfare tactics, cyber defenses, and multifaceted 
cyber strategies.228 The CCP interpreted Stuxnet as a signal that the PLA needed to refine 
its computer network defense (CND) and CNA capabilities: the PLA had to maintain its 
ability to preemptively strike, retaliate, and defend against damaging cyberattacks. In 
addition to Stuxnet, the 2013 release of classified U.S. government cyber operations 
information also impacted the pace and scope of PLA modernization. 
In 2013, Edward Snowden’s release of sensitive, classified National Security 
Administration (NSA) information to foreign governments was the last fourth wave event 
that significantly influenced PLA modernization. Snowden intentionally released 
information detailing the NSA’s deep virtual infiltration of Chinese government, 
university, and communications networks.229 The information Snowden provided only 
reinforced the CCP’s inclinations that the United States conducted continual CNE on 
Chinese networks.230 The leaked information also detailed how inferior China’s cyber 
capabilities were—relative to the United States—and revitalized the PLA’s urgency to 
field more aggressive cyber strategies.231 Subsequent to the Snowden incident, the PLA’s 
cyber functions were reorganized directly under the control of the CCP, and the PLA’s 
cyber strategy was postured to combat the U.S.’s superior skills.232  
1. Public Characterization of Strategic Cyber Modernization 
The Defense White Papers published in 2004–2015 set the tone for fourth wave 
modernization efforts because they emphasized the PLA’s development of robust cyber 
missions. The 2004 white papers referenced a key excerpt, “Revolution in Military 
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Affairs [RMA] with Chinese Characteristics.”233 In essence, that excerpt plotted the 
PLA’s course to completely transform the military’s R&D infrastructure, science and 
technology (S&T) programs, training, weaponry, and military systems: a total revolution 
of the military.234 The PLA’s top priority was progression of each PLA branch’s military 
mission, equipment, and platforms.235 Subsequent white papers released in 2006, 2008, 
and 2010 stressed similar concepts and continually built upon the themes outlined in the 
2004 white papers.236 The 2015 DWPs also upheld the principles of the 2004 white 
papers but put more emphasis on developing modernized cyber strategies and virtual 
operations—like CNO, CNE, CND, and offensive CNA. 
The 2015 white papers highlighted the PLA’s modernization initiatives of 
multilayered cybersecurity, aggressive information warfare, and offensive CNA.237 The 
white papers also outlined the consolidation of the PLA’s military and cyber strategies 
under the CCP.238 Many scholars conclude, however, that the white paper initiatives 
were not new, they were just openly disseminated to the public.239 Upon comparing 
historical white papers with China’s strategic moves from 1995–2015, the PLA’s 
development matched the CCP’s previously outlined developmental goals.240 The lack of 
new initiatives suggests the PLA’s military strategy achieved its modern, informationized 
objectives as the CCP intended.241 The 2015 DWPs were also significant because they 
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provided clues as to the driving forces that determine China’s modern cyber strategy: 
Taiwan was listed as one of China’s domestic “developmental” objectives.242 In addition 
to the doctrinal parameters the DWPs outlined, the CCP also directed the PLA’s focus 
toward renovating military equipment in each service branch. 
2. Physical Modernization Initiatives across the PLA Branches 
The PLA’s 2015 military parade was a clear demonstration of the rapid physical 
modernization programs the PLA undertook in the fourth wave.243 Phillip C. Sanders and 
Andrew Scobell, attempt to explain the drivers behind the PLA’s swift, multifaceted 
modernization of physical platforms from 2004–2015: “PLA efforts to build more robust 
military capabilities, including more capable fighter aircraft, pilots with experience flying 
over water, and unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles have also expanded the military 
options available to Chinese decision makers.”244 This section explores cases of the 
PLA’s physical modernization plans in order to compare them with previous 
modernization objectives set by the CCP.  
The PLAN significantly expanded its ships, offensive missile capabilities, 
maritime defenses, and reach across the Pacific in the fourth wave.245 Specifically, the 
PLAN modernized more than 60 percent of its frigates’ offensive and defensive 
capabilities, produced its first littoral combat ship in 2012, and fielded its first large 
aircraft carrier in 2012.246 The PLAN also developed naval vessels and submarines that 
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could combat modern submarine warfare.247 To bolster its new maritime platforms, the 
PLAN subsequently introduced the J-15 carrier landing-capable fighter and modern long-
range helicopter models.248 The PLAN’s completion of fourth wave physical initiatives 
earned it the designation as one of the few developed, modern navies.249 From 2004–
2015, the PLAAF also made enormous strides in updating its airframes. 
Over the course of nine years (2004-2015), the PLAAF became the epitome of the 
PLA’s physical modernization initiatives: it introduced new fighters, stealth aircraft, 
heavy aircraft, helicopters, air defense systems, and sophisticated missile technologies.250 
In 2010, the PLAAF produced fourth generation multirole fighter jets (the J-10 and J-11 
models) that rivaled U.S. F-15 and F-16 fighters.251 In 2011 and 2014, the PLAAF tested 
stealth-models of fifth generation multirole fighters (the J-20 and J-31).252 In addition to 
the modernized fighters, in 2006, the PLAAF produced AEW-capable aircraft.253 In the 
area of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the PLAAF manufactured a range of medium-
altitude, weaponized, long-endurance, and ISR capable UAVs.254 Apart from new 
aircraft, the PLA also advanced its long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) capabilities 
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to reach further distances across the South China and East China Seas.255 Those 
examples demonstrate the PLAAF’s diversified development of its modern air force 
platforms. PLA land and space capabilities also progressed in the fourth wave.  
From 2010–2015, the PLA Army introduced new battle tanks, armored infantry 
fighting vehicles (AIFV), and armored personnel carriers to implement modernization 
objectives across its ground forces.256 The PLA Army upgraded its artillery systems from 
towed mechanisms to self-propelled, mechanized platforms.257 Additionally, in 2015, 
Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced personnel reductions to build a lean, technically 
proficient, modernized military force.258 The personnel reductions again allowed the 
PLA to allocate excess defense funds to CCP priority areas in PLA modernization: cyber 
abilities, R&D infrastructure, and indigenous innovation.259 
Apart from the army’s advancement, PLA space systems were also modernized in 
the fourth wave. From 2000–2015, China launched more than 70 satellites into orbit and 
built robust ground-based Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar technology.260 The majority of 
the satellite and radar systems were equipped with modern military reconnaissance 
capabilities.261 The satellite launches and OTH technology development were significant 
because their tracking and ISR technology were for military use and solely dedicated to 
the PLA.262 The satellite technology is also a notable modern development because it 
assists with tracking and identification of naval vessels, which allow China to follow 
foreign naval presences in the South and East China Seas.263 Aside from examples of 
individual modernized PLA military equipment, the PLA’s cyberspace operations also 
experienced significant progress in the fourth wave. 
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3. Refining China’s Modern Cyber Strategy 
Intelligence analyst Nigel Inkster observed the enormous strides the PLA made 
toward modernizing its cyber missions in the fourth wave: “The PLA has undergone a 
doctrinal evolution…[to pursue] a highly ambitious cyber warfare agenda that aims to 
link all service branches…and has created three new departments—Informationization, 
Strategic Planning, and Training—to bring this agenda into being.”264 By 2004, the PLA 
established strategic cyber guidelines (shown in the DWPs), structured operational cyber 
units, cyber militia units, and robust cyber recruitment methods.265 The fourth wave saw 
enormous improvement to China’s cyber strategy. Since there were many upgrades to 
PLA cyber missions during that time, this section discusses cases of modernized cyber 
initiatives. Additionally, since this thesis exclusively relies on open source information, 
its discussion of the nature of PLA cyber programs may be limited. Consequently, the 
information presented in this section is an example of China’s and the PLA’s openly 
publicized cyber advancements from 2004–2015. 
a. Updates to Document 27  
Even though Document 27 emerged prior to 2004, the SILG released document 
updates that were responsive to international events occurring in the fourth wave. From 
2004–2015, Document 27 still served as the foundation for China’s cybersecurity; 
however, during key periods the CCP and SILG released supplemental guidance to 
reinforce its core tenets.266 In 2008, the CCP added provisions to Document 27 to adjust 
cybersecurity measures for the Beijing Olympics and global financial crisis.267 
Additionally, in 2012, the SILG released a new opinion stance to Document 27 that 
contained much of its original form but also improved on domestic encryption and 
critical infrastructure guidance.268 The new 2012 SILG opinion was released in the wake 
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of the Iranian Stuxnet virus and sought to bolster China’s CND against that type of 
damaging cyberattack.269 
b. Enhancements to the PLA’s Cyber Structure 
During the fourth wave, the PLA implemented multifaceted improvements to its 
military cyber units, information-focused cyber militias, technical cyber training, and 
dedicated military technology R&D institutions. Despite the incremental personnel 
reductions in each wave of modernization, the PLA’s cyber mission continued to expand 
its organization and employee base. In 2004 alone, the PLA had more than 10 million 
militia members at its disposal to conduct non-traditional information warfare operations 
and alternate PLA functions.270 Since the PLA had also drastically improved its cyber 
capabilities and virtual global reach during this time, it categorized its cyber missions by 
type and area of focus (discussed in Chapter IV). PLA cyber units were spread across 
Chinese regions and compartmentalized based on their functions: domestic information 
censorship, cybersecurity, information warfare operations, CNO, or ISR—to name a few.  
To support and continually refine those specific mission-sets, the PLA developed 
individual training and R&D institutions dedicated to each department’s distinct cyber 
mission. For example, the PLA’s Technical Reconnaissance Department has 
approximately 10 R&D institutions dedicated to providing training for its information 
security, communications intelligence (COMINT), reconnaissance, and cryptology 
missions.271 The CCP also sought to improve its future PLA soldiers’ technical skills and 
knowledge through mandated National Defense and military training courses in public 
school curriculums.272 The forward leaning changes in the PLA’s cyber structure, 
suggest that its modernized cyber strategy and mission sets (CNA, CND, and cyber 
espionage) were functioning and utilized during this time. There were other notable non-
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military cyber developments—like the proliferation of China’s underground hacking 
economy, patriotic hackers, and public Internet access—that occurred during the fourth 
wave; however, this chapter is primarily focuses on examining the role military 
developments and government cyber initiatives had on establishing China’s modern 
cyber strategy. 
c. Drawing from Western Cyber Strategies to Build China’s Cyber Strategy 
As Mulvenon observes, China’s cyber strategy and strategic Chinese cyber terms 
contain significant Western influences: “If one tracks Chinese military terminology over 
time, it is possible to discern a short lag between…new cyber concepts in the United 
States and their eventual adoption in China.”273 China observed the United States’ 
transformation into one of the first countries that developed sophisticated, cutting-edge 
technologies and subsequently adapted those technologies to engage in informationized 
warfare and cyber warfare. China knew it would have to assimilate those Western 
principles if it wanted to reach a similar level of technological superiority.274 
Wang Baocun was an early contributor to China’s modern cyber strategy for his 
studies on U.S. military cyber concepts and subsequent introduction of those concepts 
into Chinese strategic thought.275 Wang was not a cyber expert; he was an expert on U.S. 
military strategies.276 Wang observed the United States’ early use of the cyber concept 
“information warfare” and subsequently incorporated it into China’s early cyber 
strategy.277 Similar Chinese experts on U.S. military strategy noticed the evolution of 
Western strategic cyber terms: “information warfare” became “information operations” 
and eventually converted into “network operations.”278 Adapting to the Western 
evolution, Chinese strategic cyber terms evolved in the same way. “Information warfare” 
                                                 
273 Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 254.  
274 Jason Kelly, “A Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs?” Yale Journal of International Affairs 1, 
no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2006): 58–59, http://www.yale.edu/yjia/articles/Vol_1_Iss_2_Spring2006/ 
kelly217.pdf; Heginbotham et al., U.S.-China Military Scorecard, 273. 
275 Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 254. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Blasko, Chinese Army Today, 2nd ed., 130–31.  
278 Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 254.  
 59 
was used in early PLA writings, then moved to “information operations,” and 
incorporated “network operations” in more recent publications.279 “Network operations” 
underwent further revision until China’s modern CNO strategy was formed.280 While 
China’s strategic thought on military and cyber operations incorporate U.S. and Western 
strategic concepts, China’s modern cyber strategy is unique in the assimilated nature in 
which it employs this strategy, which is discussed further in Chapter IV. 
E. SUMMARY 
Since 1978, PLA modernization progressed in four distinct waves—with each 
wave emphasizing a specific theme in the PLA’s advancement. The first wave from 
1978–1988, introduced modern doctrinal concepts and transformed the PLA into an 
autonomous business-like force. The second wave from 1989–1996, was a lull period for 
actual modernization initiatives, but it significantly impacted the PLA’s future 
advancement because of international events that occurred during that time. Second wave 
events forced the CCP to refocus domestic priorities toward dual economic and military 
development. In the third wave (1997–2003), the CCP’s increased urgency toward PLA 
modernization forced the military to adopt an informationized cyber strategy. By the 
fourth wave (2004–2015), the PLA implemented the physical modernization of its 
military equipment.  
Over the course of the four waves, the PLA developed new technologically 
focused doctrines, robust acquisitions systems, and multifaceted advanced military 
platforms. An examination of China’s DWPs (released from 1998–2015), compared with 
the PLA’s strategic moves during modernization suggest the PLA’s modernization 
initiatives and cyber strategy developed in accordance with the CCP’s objectives. This 
chapter presents evidence of the PLA’s key, developed cyber missions and operations 
during the waves of modernization to address debates in the literature about China 
lacking an observable cyber strategy. The evidence indicates that China does in fact 
employ a coherent cyber strategy. Additionally, this chapter examines the CCP’s and 
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PLA’s deliberate development of specific cyber initiatives during key time periods of 
PLA modernization to suggest the PLA developed China’s modern version of a cyber 
strategy. The next chapter provides an analysis of China’s modern cyber strategy and 
discusses its core tenets.  
 61 
IV. COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS WITH “CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS” 
Modern Chinese cyber strategy stresses ambiguity in its virtual operations and 
“[cyber warfare] victory through inferiority over superiority,” which were warfighting 
principles adopted from Sun Zi and Mao Zedong.281 Ambiguity in Chinese cyber 
operations allows Chinese operators to employ deception, information warfare, and 
“active [cyber] offense.” “Victory through inferiority over superiority,”282 refers to how 
China can creatively leverage its weaker cyber methods (in relation to that of the United 
States) to win cyber battles.283 From those principles, Western analyses interpret China’s 
modern cyber strategy as CNO that necessitates the use of CNA, cyber espionage, CND, 
and ISR in order for China to achieve military, economic, and developmental objectives.  
Based on the information above, this chapter establishes that cyber espionage is a 
conscious, deliberate function of China’s cyber strategy by identifying its structural 
features, the PLA’s organizational methods, and the core concepts that are unique to this 
strategy. This chapter discusses the organizational structure of China’s cyber mission 
under the PLA, individual case studies of PLA cyber units, and China’s CNO principles 
to solidify this study’s thesis. This examination of how the PLA directs and delegates its 
specific cyber missions also provides clues as to how the PLA employs cyber espionage 
against potential targets. This chapter ultimately studies the characteristics of China’s 
modern cyber strategy and its implementation of cyber methods to provide clues on how 
cyber espionage fits into the PLA and its modernization efforts. As explored in the next 
section, the majority of China’s CNO responsibilities are delegated from the CCP to the 
PLA and further organized from there. 
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A. DECONSTRUCTING THE ORGANIZATIONAL FEATURES OF 
CHINA’S CYBER STRATEGY 
The CCP is situated at the top of the Chinese government and maintains a 
hierarchical structure over subordinate organizations (the Central Military Commission 
[CMC], State Council, and Leading Small Groups [LSG]) but especially China’s cyber 
strategy. As shown in Figure 3, the chain of command for all organizations flows back to 
the party, underscoring its top-down authority structure.284 The State Council is China’s 
large bureaucracy; the CMC is the party’s enforcement arm; the LSGs make national, 
military, and cyber policy recommendations to the CCP.285 Prior to 2014, China’s cyber 
mission, policies, and strategy were managed by the State Council.286 Working in concert 
with the State Council, the SILG monitors China’s cyber operations.287 The organization 
of China’s cyber mission under the large state bureaucracy has contributed to 
complications in China’s strategic cyber implementation. 
Jon R. Lindsay, Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the 
Toronto Munk School of Global Affairs, highlights the difficulty China’s rigid, 
authoritarian organization has on its cyber missions: “As in other areas of Chinese policy, 
the implementation of cybersecurity is disjointed functionally and regionally, rife with 
rent seeking bureaucratic agencies and enterprises.”288 The increasingly complicated 
bureaucratic over management of China’s cyber operations has allowed multiple 
organizations to contribute to China’s strategic cyber implementation.289 Additionally, 
due to the closed nature of the Chinese government’s authoritarian structure, cyber 
operational information is stovepiped, the many Chinese cyber organizations vary in their 
implementation of cyber strategies, and they overlap on similar cyber functions.290 As 
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Lindsay details, the fragmented, decentralized nature in which China implements its 
overall cyber strategy, to include PLA cyber operations, is ultimately a function of 
China’s bureaucratic mismanagement and rigid organization of its cyber units, which is 
discussed in further depth later in this chapter. 
In an attempt to address this bureaucratic mismanagement, after 2014, President 
Xi Jinping added a new Cybersecurity Leading Small Group (CILG), which effectively 
shifted the policy arm of China’s cyber strategy directly under his control.291 Physical 
application and implementation of China’s cyber strategy—cyber warfare, cyber 
operations, and cybersecurity—fall under the CMC. The specific delegation of Chinese 
cyber missions under the State Council and to the CCP, suggests China’s robust cyber 
missions are central to the CCP’s priorities, granting cyber special attention by state 
offices. 
Since the CMC is the CCP’s arm to manage the military, the CMC acts as an 
envoy between the party and the PLA—with China’s president typically serving as the 
CMC Chairman.292 Under the CMC, there are four General Departments (General Staff, 
Equipment, Logistics, and Administration) that carry out the PLA’s policy guidance, 
training, and military strategic planning.293 In addition to the General Departments 
exhibited in Figure 2, the PLA is also geographically divided into seven regions, shown 
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in Table 1.294 All PLA regions, divisions, bureaus, and units fall under the General 
Departments’ command.295 
Figure 2.  Organization of China’s Major Departments and Cyber Missions 
under the CCP 
 
Source: Jon R. Lindsay, “Introduction—China and Cybersecurity: Controversy,” in 
China and Cybersecurity” Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, ed. 
Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 8. 
To maintain consolidated control across China, the CCP distributes PLA military 
groups across regions. PLA divisions are directly under military groups and are divided 
among Chinese districts: Beijing has Hebei, Shanxi, and Nei Menggu military districts.296 
Apart from location ordering principles, PLA bureaus and units are assigned numbered 
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identifiers (Military Unit Cover Designators [MUCD])297 to mask their true functions: 
PLA Unit 61398 is an example of an MUCD.298 As shown in Table 1, the geographical 
separation and MUCD numbering system gives an added degree of anonymity to the 
PLA’s already ambiguous missions.299 The added degree of anonymity helps China to 
employ deception in cyberspace and accomplish cyber objectives without direct attribute, 
however, it also contributes to the fragmented implementation of China’s cyber strategy 
as previously discussed. In addition to the physical organization features in the PLA’s 
chain of command features are organized in a similar rigid manner. 
Table 1.   Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus by Region and MUCD 
 
Source: Project Camerashy: Closing the Aperture on China’s Unit 78020 (Arlington, 
VA: ThreatConnect and Defense Group, Inc. [DGI], 2015), 78, https://www.threat 
connect.com/camerashy/.  
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Within the PLA, each unit has specified chain of command and mission functions 
that follow the CCP’s rigid organizational theme. The geographical separation and one-
directional flow of orders limits cross-talk between organizations and adds 
compartmentalization.300 Similarly, the CCP delegates PLA mission sets to specific 
units. For example, cyber operations like offensive network sabotage and psychological 
operations exclusively belong to PLA Special Operations Forces.301 The rigidity of PLA 
organizational features impacts the wide-scale implementation of China’s cyber strategy 
and also suggests that the CCP and PLA employ cyber espionage in a conscious, 
deliberate manner much like their operational cyber structure.302  
Since the 1980s, the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD) has carried out the 
practical application and physical implementation of China’s cyber strategy—cyber 
warfare, CNO, and cybersecurity.303 The GSD manages the implementation of China’s 
physical cyber missions and directs cybersecurity for the PLA’s networks.304 Under the 
GSD, and across the PLA’s regions, China’s cyber missions are further delegated to 
Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRB) that have service-specific and region-specific 
operational cyber missions.305 Each PLA service—the PLAAF, the PLAN, and the PLA 
Army—has their own TRBs spread out China.306 The TRBs engage in military-centric 
analysis, translation, and interpretation of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), COMINT, and 
exploited cyber network information.307 TRB missions are further distinguished by their 
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branch-specific functions and global areas of focus. For example, PLAAF TRBs may 
focus on imagery analysis or SIGINT collection on Southeast Asian targets, while PLAN 
TRBs may focus on SIGINT collection of naval intelligence and foreign navies operating 
near China.308 The TRB’s noted and observed cyber, SIGINT, COMINT, and ISR 
collection missions through virtual means, further indicate that CNE is a key mission 
under China’s CNO. In order to further establish how TRBs, and ultimately the PLA, 
employ cyber espionage, the next section conducts a case study of one PLA TRB. 
1. Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus: A Case Study of PLA Unit 78020 
PLA Unit 78020 is just one of the PLA’s TRBs, and its cyber missions are a good 
example to study for the insight they provide into how the PLA units employ cyber 
espionage under its CNO. To maintain secrecy around PLA cyber missions, the CMC 
deliberately compartmentalizes PLA cyber bureau functions and uses MUCDs to 
maintain the clandestine nature of their missions. U.S. cybersecurity, high-technology 
and threat intelligence collection firms ThreatConnect and DGI, however, examine 
Chinese CNO, CNA, and CND trends over time and uses their originating source, 
personnel characteristics, employment requirements, and open source training 
information to determine the functions of individual Chinese cyber units—like PLA Unit 
78020. ThreatConnect and DGI reported in 2015 that PLA Unit 78020 (known as Naikon 
APT) is a cyber exploitation unit in one of China’s TRBs.309 PLA Unit 78020 is located 
under the PLA Army’s Second TRB in the Chengdu Region (reference Table 1). 
ThreatConnect and DGI conclude that Unit 78020’s mission is related to China’s 
tensions in the South China Sea based on Unit 78020’s CNE and SIGINT collection of 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations ([ASEAN] Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
the Philippines), government, private, and military entities with presences in Southeast 
Asia.310 ThreatConnect and DGI also traced Unit 78020’s cyber espionage activity back 
to the origination date of 2010, which was also the year the Sino-Japanese conflict over 
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the Diaoyu Islands began. Since then, Unit 78020 has exfiltrated cyber intelligence from 
countries that have also asserted claims in the South China Sea: like its cyber espionage 
campaigns on classified Filipino Naval intelligence following Sino-Filipino island 
contention.311 Those examples further substantiate determinations that PLA Unit 78020’s 
mission is concentrated on nations with dealings in the South China Sea.312 
PLA Unit 78020’s organization and cyber exploitation profile demonstrates the 
role TRBs play in China’s cyber strategy and cyber mission implementation. Unit 
78020’s targeted cyber campaigns against Southeast Asian countries demonstrates the 
deliberate role in which cyber espionage is employed within the PLA—suggesting that 
cyber espionage is employed in a similar manner toward other PLA objectives. PLA Unit 
78020’s use of cyber espionage to collect intelligence on the CCP’s domestic and 
international priority target areas (nations neighboring the South China Sea) highlights 
the foundational concept that cyber espionage plays a central role in China’s overall 
cyber strategy. In contrast from the cyber intelligence collection and analysis missions 
the TRBs conduct, alternate GSD departments work in conjunction with the TRBs to 
execute China’s offensive cyber strategy.  
2. PLA Operational Cyber Departments 
Adding to the complexity of China’s cyber mission organization, the GSD is 
further broken down into three cyber operations departments, as Figure 4 shows.313 The 
GSD departments that conduct China’s CNO are the Third Technical Reconnaissance 
Department and the Fourth Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department.314 To 
supplement the PLA’s cyber missions, the PLA also employs civilian-integrated PLA 
cyber militias and subject matter expert (SME) civilian hackers (white-hat, patriotic, and 
black-hat hackers) to ensure China’s cyber strategy is executed in its entirety. The 
variance on military, government, and civilian hackers almost guarantees the completion 
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of the CCP’s national priorities because several competing entities engage in various 
CNE methods to ensure the missions’ success.315 Although the departments’ and cyber 
militias’ distinct functions are not publicly announced, open-source information suggests 
their functions include domestic cyber monitoring, COMINT, CNE, CNA, and CND.316 
Analyses of the PLA’s Third and Fourth Department cyber missions liken their 
organization to U.S. organizations: the Third Department is similar to the U.S. military’s 
Cyber Command, and the Fourth Department is comparable to the NSA.317  
Figure 3.  Organization of PLA Operational Cyber Departments  
under the CMC  
 
Source: “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant (February 
2013), 7–8, http://intelreport.mandiant.com/.  
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The Third Department has 12 operational bureaus that are individually tasked 
with specific functions under China’s CNO, further highlighting the deliberate manner in 
which the PLA’s cyber operations are organized and executed.318 The departments are 
separated by their functions and by countries of interest (as shown in Figure 5): the 
Fourth Bureau’s (PLA Unit 61419) focus area is East Asia with a concentration on Japan 
and the Koreas.319 Additionally, the Second Bureau (PLA Unit 61398) has been 
designated as China’s CNA and exploitation bureau of Western industrial, military, and 
government targets.320 
Figure 4.  PLA Operational Cyber Bureaus under the Third Department  
 
Adapted from: Mark A. Stokes, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Computer 
Network Operations Infrastructure,” in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, 
and Politics in the Digital Domain, ed. Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. 
Reveron (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 168–72. 
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The PLA does not openly publish each bureau’s specific cyber missions, but 
conclusions on the bureaus’ functions are built by Mark A. Stokes, a respected military 
analyst of the PLA who was also a former U.S. Air Force attaché, from contextual clues 
about the units: their location within China, how many offices they have, how much 
manpower is dedicated to them, the type of training their personnel receive, and the type 
of translators hired. For example, the Fourth Bureau is designated as a Japanese and 
Korean focus based on its use of Korean linguists and the central location of its offices in 
the Qingdao region—which falls in east-northeast China in close proximity to both Korea 
and Japan.321  
3. PLA Operational Cyber Bureaus: A Case Study of PLA Unit 61398 
Mandiant’s 2013 cyber threat report on the cyber espionage group APT 1, or PLA 
Unit 61398, was the first significant in-depth look at how China and the PLA conduct 
CNO—namely cyber espionage.322 Since 2006, Mandiant compiled enough data to link 
APT 1’s cyber actions to the Chinese government-sponsored PLA Unit 61398.323 
Mandiant confirmed PLA Unit 61398 likely executes the PLA’s CNA and CND missions 
as part of China’s larger CNO strategy. Mandiant also based its conclusions on Unit 
61398’s operational functions based on the unit’s organization under the GSD’s Third 
Technical Reconnaissance Department and its physical offices’ locations around 
China.324 PLA Unit 61398 is centrally located in Shanghai, has thousands of employees, 
and primarily recruits employees with English speaking capabilities and formal technical 
computer training.325 
Over 80 percent of Unit 61398’s CNA and CNO operations (conducted from 
2006–2013) were executed on Western targets, which further indicates that Unit 61398’s 
                                                 
321 Stokes, “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Computer Network,” 171.  
322 “APT 1,” 1–2, 7–9, 20; Inkster, “Chinese Intelligence Agencies,” 44; U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, “Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities,” 243. 
323 “APT 1,” 2–3, 7, 26, 31; Martinez et al., “Major U.S. Weapons Compromised.” 
324 “APT 1,” 2–3, 7–9; Stokes, “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Computer Network,” 163–65; 
Finklestein, “General Staff Department,” 158–61; Inkster, “Chinese Intelligence Agencies,” 32–33. 
325 “APT 1,” 10–16, 19.  
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focus area is U.S., Canadian, and English-speaking industries and also suggests the 
deliberate nature in which China’s CNO operations are employed.326 PLA Unit 61398’s 
list of cyber espionage exploitations range from specific U.S. military schematics, World 
Anti-Doping Agency information prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and personal 
communications from the Coca-Cola Corporation. Even though China denies the 
legitimacy of Mandiant’s report, Mandiant’s concludes, “In a state that rigorously 
monitors Internet use, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese government is unaware of [a 
large cyber] attack group that operates from the Pudong New Area of Shanghai.”327 
Previous discussions on the CCP’s domestic Internet controls and its rigid, 
compartmentalized organization of the PLA also uphold the notion that the PLA’s CNA, 
CNE, CND, and ISR operations are deliberate, government-sanctioned actions. The 
specific principles emphasized under China’s CNO also provide clues on how and why 
the PLA employs targeted cyber espionage campaigns. 
B. CHINA’S CYBER STRATEGY AS COMPUTER NETWORK 
OPERATIONS 
China’s current cyber strategy, described as CNO with “Chinese characteristics” 
by Chinese publications, incorporates core cyber warfare principles and situation-
dependent scenarios and responses.328 CNO is practiced by many nations in the world, 
and much like other nations, China’s CNO principles are refined to make its cyber 
operations responsive to China’s domestic and international needs, as this section 
discusses. As Table 2 shows, China’s CNO is similar to the U.S.’s cyber strategy but is 
adapted to fit into China’s cyber strategy.329 The situation-dependent strategies built into 
China’s cyber strategy are preemptive strategic choices that reflect the CCP’s need to 
switch priorities based on the issues China faces.330 One example of a situation-
dependent scenario is Taiwan reunification: China’s CNO necessitates the use of CNA 
                                                 
326 “APT 1,” 3–4, 9.   
327 Thomas, “China’s Cyber Incursions,” 13; “APT 1,” 2. 
328 Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense. 
329 Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 254, 258–61.  
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against Taiwan if the island pursues an aggressive move toward independence; China’s 
CNO also calls for CNA against the United States if it attempts to intervene in a Sino-
Taiwanese conflict.331 Each situation-dependent CNO strategy has several potential 
scenarios and outcomes that would allow for certain cyber methods and escalation 
tactics.332 
Table 2.   China’s Computer Network Operations (CNO) Strategy 
Deconstructed 
Core Concept Description Why? 
1. DEFENSE FIRST 
CND is the top priority. Once 
secure, develop “tactical 
counteroffensives” 
Because United States conducts high-




Use preemptive CNA to exploit an 
adversary’s technological 
vulnerabilities (damaging their 
ability to respond) or to create more 
favorable conditions for offensive 
cyber operations 
Because China faces more 
technologically savvy adversaries (the 
United States) in cyber warfare and 






CNA is used as an unconventional 
cyber method in the pre-stages of 
conflict to gain an advantage, but 
not for ongoing operations 
Because it helps China conduct quick 
decisive cyber actions in the case that 
an adversary cuts off China’s access to 
the adversarial networks or fixes their 
network vulnerabilities 
4. PREEMPTIVE CNA 
FOR INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS 
Use CNA to win in information 
warfare and limit or altogether 
eliminate the possibility of 
conventional war 
Because China’s ability to monitor and 
conduct information campaigns is 
highly effective, China can use this skill 
in cyberspace to prevent war 




TECHNOLOGY IN C4I 
Develop Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence (C4I) capabilities that 
do not rely solely on information 
technology 
Because China believes it is not as 
technologically dependent as other 
countries (the United States) 
 
Adapted from: James Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, 
Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than 
Taiwan, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 259–60, 266, 269; Kevin Pollpeter, 
“Chinese Writings on Cyberwarfare and Coercion,” in China and Cybersecurity: 
Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain, ed. Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming 
Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron (New York: Oxford University Press), 141–42, 145. 
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Deliberate CNA and CNE allow China’s CNO to target an adversary’s IT and 
military network information.333 Modern Chinese cyber strategists provide insight into 
why China emphasizes CNA, CNE, and CND in its CNO: “[CNA] is one of the most 
effective means for a weak military to fight a strong one.”334 This quote China’s strategy 
of leveraging its inferior (“weak military”) cyber and military capabilities, in reference to 
the U.S.’s, to gain advantage over stronger nations. The deconstruction of China’s CNO 
principles and targets provides further insight into why and how the PLA employs certain 
cyber methods. 
China’s current CNO strategy relies on CNA and CNE for high priority targets: 
adversarial logistics information, computer network information, and military personnel 
data. An example of a CNO high priority target would be the infiltration and extraction of 
DOD unclassified Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) information 
rather than Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) data.335 NIPRNET 
information is a primary target because a compromise of its personnel data, logistics 
operation information, and mission procedures could hinder or impede how the U.S. 
military conducts missions, operates in warfare, or even accomplishes routine tasks.336 
An example of a high priority target could potentially include the 2015 exploitation of 
millions of U.S. government employee files from OPM. Even though the United States 
has not determined the way in which the exfiltrated OPM data will be exploited, those 
OPM files contained personnel data and were stored on a relatively unsecure, easily 
accessible network. While it is not confirmed that OPM was a high priority target under 
Chinese CNO, the correlation between the breached OPM military and government 
personnel data and its placement on an unclassified network correlates to the previously 
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mentioned Chinese CNO high priority target criteria.337 Examples of Chinese cyber 
exploitation operations that parallel the CNO’s high priority targets, like the OPM breach, 
also suggest that cyber espionage under China’s CNO can be pursued in a  deliberate 
manner. 
Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) is also a key principle under 
China’s CNO because it addresses China’s cyber warfare actions. INEW was developed 
in 1999 but China evolved from its original form into a cyber principle that combines 
CNO with information censorship.338 INEW differs from U.S. cyber operations in which 
the United States views information operations and CNA as independent missions and 
separates them under distinct electronic warfare (EW) and CNO subcategories. China’s 
INEW advocates the simultaneous use of CNO and information operations to disrupt 
enemy networks.339 Compared to Russia’s and the U.S.’s developed skills, China’s CNO 
and INEW cyber methods are often characterized as rudimentary and basic because 
INEW relies on user-friendly, cost-effective, quick-result methods—like DDOS and 
spearphishing.340 The principles outlined under China’s CNO and INEW indicate that the 
PLA deliberately employs cyber espionage against specific targets. The calculated nature 
in which cyber espionage is employed also establishes the key role cyber espionage plays 
in PLA operations—including PLA modernization. 
C. SUMMARY 
The rigid organization of China’s cyber mission under the CCP and PLA indicates 
that the methods (CNA, CNE, cyber espionage, and CND) employed under China’s CNO 
are deliberate missions delegated to specific PLA units. Two examples of how China’s 
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requests; Mulvenon, “PLA Computer Network Operations,” 279–80; Lindsay, “Introduction,” 18; Lindsay, 
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CNO employs cyber espionage as a preferential, targeted, and established method under 
China’s CNO strategy are PLA Unit 78020’s TRB functions of ISR, SIGINT, and 
COMINT collection on Southeast and East Asian nations in the South China Sea; and 
PLA Unit 61398’s aggressive, operational CNE of Western targets. Unit 78020’s focused 
Southeast Asian cyber espionage campaigns also highlight the distinct role cyber 
espionage plays in PLA modernization. Additionally, the principles outlined in China’s 
CNO speak directly to China’s use of aggressive CNA, CNE, and CND methods to 
accomplish its military and national objectives. 
This chapter outlines the organization of China’s cyber functions under the CCP 
and PLA and discusses China’s CNO principles to show that the PLA employs cyber 
espionage as a deliberate and conscious cyber method. Since this chapter establishes that 
cyber espionage assists the PLA in its domestic, regional, and target-specific cyber 
operations, Chapter V demonstrates that cyber espionage assists the PLA in its 
modernization—but not to an exclusive degree. 
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V. PLA CYBER AND NON-CYBER ACQUISITION METHODS 
U.S. defense and news reports often compare noted examples of Chinese CNE 
with individual cases of modernized PLA equipment to explain the rapid pace at which 
the PLA advances.341 These reports, however, discount the role alternate acquisitions—
technology transfers, traditional espionage, and indigenous R&D—also play in PLA 
modernization.342 While studies of China’s CNE provide insight into how it implements 
CNO, the studies do not fully illustrate how cyber espionage fits into PLA modernization. 
As demonstrated by PLA Unit 61398’s increased CNE from 2006–2013 (Figure 
6), China has an established, growing record of cyber espionage. Figure 6 shows China’s 
pronounced CNE use but does not distinguish if these operations assist the PLA. This 
chapter engages in this discussion through comparing the following: examples of Chinese 
cyber espionage cases with their targets; the PLA’s alternate acquisitions methods; and 
developmental timelines of the PLA’s modernized platforms. This comparison 
establishes the role state-sponsored cyber espionage plays in PLA modernization.343  
Figure 5.  Timeline of PLA Unit 61398’s CNE Incidents from 2006–2013 
 
Source: “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant (February 
2013), 20, http://intelreport.mandiant.com/.  
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The exploited cyber espionage targets this chapter discusses are broken up into 
three categories: military, domestic development, and diplomatic targets. In 
distinguishing between these three categories, this study engages in a more accurate 
analysis and identification of cyber espionage campaigns that have the potential to 
directly assist the PLA and PLA modernization efforts. To further categorize Chinese 
cyber espionage targets, “military targets” include CNE and network intrusions 
committed against military entities, the DOD, defense firms, defense-contracted 
companies, or specific military platforms. “Domestic development targets” include cyber 
intrusions against private industries (Google or energy companies) for communications 
technology, semi-conductors, developmental metals, and alternate energy data. 
“Diplomatic targets” include foreign governments, multinational firms, or non-
government organizations that correlate to CCP policy objectives. An example of a 
diplomatic target is the Chinese-sponsored CNE of Taiwanese government servers or the 
Dalai Lama’s networks following Taiwanese and Tibetan dissidence movements. Taiwan 
and Dalai Lama networks are diplomatic targets because maintaining Chinese territorial 
integrity is a top domestic policy concern for the CCP. 
A. CYBER ESPIONAGE 
China and the PLA entities engage in state-sponsored cyber espionage. Numerous 
cases reinforce that statement: Author Franz-Stefan Gady reports, “At least 30,000 
hacking incidents, more than 500 significant intrusions in DOD systems, at least 1,600 
DOD computers penetrated, and more than 600,000 user accounts compromised…the 
amount of data extracted (50 terabytes) to be equal to five Libraries of Congress.”344 
Since early 2000, reports of suspected Chinese cyber espionage of U.S. military and U.S. 
defense contractors have increased in frequency and magnitude. U.S. defense reports 
often make the key assumption, without establishing the basis, that cyber espionage is the 
key driver behind the PLA’s modernization efforts.345 This section, however, establishes 
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the foundation that defense reports do not. This section and Table 3 specifically, present 
examples of Chinese cyber espionage on U.S. targets and compares the responsible entity 
with the type of exploited target (military, economic, or diplomatic). A CNE target study 
and identification of responsible entities (whether government, military, or private) 
highlights how these cyber espionage potentially corresponds to PLA modernization or 
domestic developmental goals. This section’s comparison demonstrates the role cyber 
espionage plays in CCP priorities and PLA modernization objectives. 
1. A Study of Cyber Espionage Campaigns and Their Targets 
The PLA cannot be singled out for CNE of foreign military targets because it is 
not the only Chinese entity that conducts cyber espionage: Chinese-attributed CNE 
entities range from the PLA, government entities, Chinese universities, individual non-
government hackers, and corporate businesses. These entities, even if they are not 
government-sanctioned, also exploit military and defense information. As Table 3 shows, 
China’s CNA, CNE, and CND missions are not exclusive to government or PLA entities: 
suspected PLA-sponsored cyber espionage does not always exploit military targets, and 
individual or university-sponsored hackers do not exclusively strike economic or private 
industry targets.346 The correlations in the data, however, match the CCP’s domestic and 
military developmental objectives shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5 and outlined in Figure 6. 
Yet it remains unclear how the specific data exfiltrated was subsequently utilized. These 
reports do not specifically detail if the information was put to use for PLA modernization 
or CCP domestic and foreign policy objectives.347 If in the future new information 
emerges that details how the exploited information was employed, the findings of this 
section may need to be modified. 
Table 3 has been created by synthesizing data from a wide range of sources that 
include government-sponsored studies, scholarly articles and books, private security firm 
publications, and media reports. The entries in this table are organized by their operation 
code name and the hacking group that exploited the target. Each listed CNE entry may be 
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comprised of several campaigns or a singular campaign but are grouped into one entry to 
delineate them by their exploiting entity and code name. The “PRC-attributed entity” is 
compiled from multiple open-source references that list the same hacking group for the 
CNE operations. The “year of attack” is approximated from its open-source reported end 
date. Several of the listed CNE operations lasted several years, which is noted with a date 
range under “year of attack.” 
This table also makes the assumption that all listed cyber operations were, in one 
way or another, government-sanctioned campaigns—whether directly sanctioned before 
the event or endorsed after its completion. Consequently, this table also demonstrates the 
range of hacking entities in China. As discussed in Chapter II, there are many Chinese 
government-sponsored cyber entities and many “underground hacking” entities that also 
contribute to Chinese-originating cyber espionage. This table is organized to show the 
overlapping target areas that indirect non-government entities and government-attributed 
actors pursue. Cyber espionage campaigns that exploited military targets are highlighted 
in green; economic targets are highlighted in gray, and diplomatic targets are highlighted 
in orange. 
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(March 2015), 2, http://www.novetta.com/wpcontent/uploads2014/11/BirdsEyeView_ 
001_March_2015.pdf; Joey Cheng and Kevin McCaney, “Cyber Charges against China 
Could Raise the Stakes for U.S. Command,” Defense Systems, last modified May 19, 
2014, https://defensesystems.com/articles/2014/05/19/us-china-cyber-charges.aspx; 
Christian de Looper, “Chinese Hackers Piggybacked Forbes.com to Attack U.S. Defense 
and Financial Industry Computers,” Tech Times, February 11, 2015, 
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forbes-com-to-attack-us-defense-and-financial-industry-computers.htm; John E. Dunn, 
“Chinese ‘Hidden Lynx’ Hackers behind Major Cyberattacks on U.S., Claims Symantic,” 
Tech World, last modified September 17, 2013, http://www.techworld.com/ 
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201109; Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber 
Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation (McLean, VA: Northrup Grumman, 2009), 
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files/IS3903_pp007-047.pdf; Jon R. Lindsay and Tai Ming Cheung, “From Exploitation 
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Hackers Hit Forbes Visitors with Zero-day Exploits,” Security Affairs, February 12, 
2015, http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/33417/cyber-crime/chinese-hackers-hit-
forbes.html; “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” Center for Strategic International 
Studies, last modified July 13, 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/ 
150714_Significant_Cyber_Events_List.pdf; Project Camerashy: Closing the Aperture 
on China’s Unit 78020 (Arlington, VA: ThreatConnect and Defense Group, Inc. [DGI], 
2015), 8–10, 12, 15–16, 20, 23, 74, https://www.threatconnect.com/camerashy/; 
“Piercing the Cow’s Tongue: China Targeting South China Seas Nations,” 
ThreatConnect, last modified May 19, 2014, http://www.threatconnect.com/piercing-the-
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Different Strategic Method of Thought,” OE Watch (March 2013): 12–13, 21–22, 
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2013 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: USCC), 244–48, 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/ 
Chapter%202%3B%20Section%202%20China%27s%20Cyber%20Activities.pdf. 
2. Cyber Intrusions that Likely Assisted PLA Modernization 
This study identifies which CNE operations exploited which target types. The 
evidence shows that certain cyber espionage—those that were PLA-sponsored and 
employed against military targets—likely aided the PLA’s modernization. Examples that 
exploited military targets that also came from Chinese government- or PLA-sponsored 
entities to represent the CNE that likely aided PLA operations and modernization efforts. 
Upon analyzing the targets in Table 3, eight348 of the 24 total entries involved direct 
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several categories due to the wide variance of targets pursued under individual attacks.  
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targeting of U.S. DOD and Defense Firms, and hence are listed as potential intrusions 
that assisted PLA modernization efforts: Byzantine Hydes, Shady Rat, 2007 F-35 exploit, 
Hidden Lynx, mid-2000-2013 Comment Crew military systems exploit, 2014 U.S. 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) exploit, Sunshop Group, and Naikon APT. For 
example, Shady Rat and Byzantine Hydes are classified as cyber intrusions that likely 
aided PLA modernization because their origination point came from a PLA entity, and 
their targets are U.S. Defense Firms and military contractors.  
U.S. government information released after the Edward Snowden information 
leaks confirmed that the Chinese exfiltrated sensitive engine-functioning data, radar 
technology, missile guidance, and stealth technology from the U.S. F-22 and F-35 fighter 
aircrafts (fifth generation fighter jets).349 Reports subsequently indicate the cyber 
exploitation of the U.S.’s fifth generation fighter critical program information (CPI) 
technology directly correlate to and resulted in the PLA’s development of its fifth 
generation multirole J-31 and J-20 fighter aircrafts.350 The overlapping cyber exploitation 
data also shows parallels to China’s CNO doctrine and DWP objectives. The PLA-
sponsored cyber exploitation of specific U.S. military platform technical data and 
schematics (F-22, F-35, Littoral Combat Ship, Global Hawk UAS) from mid-2000-2013, 
and the 2014 PLA’s suspected cyberattack on TRANSCOM match the PLA’s 
modernization goals: China’s 2015 white papers stress building “a modern system of 
military forces” and a PLA capable of “mobile operations and multi-dimensional offense 
and defense.”351 Specifically, the DWPs stress improving the PLA Army’s “trans-
theater”352 transportation capabilities; advancing the PLA’s missile and precision-guided 
weaponry; refining the PLA’s logistics and support systems; and “[optimizing] its nuclear 
force structure.353 Although it is unclear how the targeted information was used, these 
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DWP objectives suggests that if Chinese government or PLA entities exploited foreign 
military technical data, they would use it to further DWP goals. 
The Titan Rain and Luckycat cyber intrusions targeted DOD networks and could 
have provided critical information about U.S. military systems that would aid the PLA’s 
modernization progress; however, based on open source information, their origination 
point was a non-government or inconclusive entity, which was not directly tied to the 
PLA.354 Consequently, since the originating source of the cyber intrusion is not directly 
linked to the PLA, a direct link cannot be drawn between the exploited defense 
information and its assistance in PLA modernization goals. 
PLA-attributed CNE did not always exploit military or U.S. defense contractor 
systems. Cyber intrusions, like the PLA’s cyber intrusions into U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates’ office computers are labeled as “diplomatic targets,” rather than as 
“military targets” because they did not directly exploit modern U.S. military equipment: 
the cyber intrusion targeted Gates’ personal communications and computer applications. 
Apart from the military-related cyber espionage operations, there are also a 
similar percentage of economic development CNE-directed attacks. The relatively even 
breakdown between each CNE target area indicates that Chinese cyber espionage is not 
exclusively devoted to PLA modernization objectives; it also suggests that Chinese cyber 
espionage is potentially dedicated toward broader goals set by the CCP and not 
exclusively toward the PLA’s advancement. 
3. Cyber Intrusions that Likely Aided Chinese Domestic Development 
Objectives 
To continually progress its domestic development, China uses Five-Year Plans 
(FYP) and Medium and Long Term Plans for Science and Technology Development 
(MLP) as developmental guidelines. These plans outline developmental focus areas that 
are responsive to domestic and international conditions China faces. The objectives in 
each plan also correlate to some of the exploited CNE targets in Table 3. In order to 
discuss the cyber espionage campaigns that likely aided China’s domestic development 
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objectives, this section first provides an outline of the CCP’s developmental priorities 
since 1990 to engage in an accurate comparison of the developmental objectives and 
Chinese CNE operations. Since the CCP is the premier authority in China, policies, plans, 
and developmental objectives are set at the top and delegated downward. This section 
examines the CCP’s domestic policies that influence the targets and objectives pursued 
under China’s CNO and also occupy a portion of China’s state-sponsored cyber 
espionage agenda. 
a. Five-Year Plans 
China’s FYPs set industrial, military, and societal development benchmarks for 
China to achieve every five years.355 Earlier FYPs were geared toward major economic 
improvements, but recent plans are oriented toward PLA modernization and 
technological development.356 While the variance in plans (as Table 4 shows) gives 
insight into the CCP’s foreign and domestic policy priorities, the FYPs are also 
domestically unifying instruments. The CCP uses FYPs to motivate government, 
military, and private citizens toward shared goals that improve the quality of life, 
economy, and military in China.357 
  
                                                 
355 Theodore Shabad, “Communist China’s Five Year Plan,” Far Eastern Survey 24, no. 12 
(December 1955): 189–91, doi: 10.2307/3023788; Joseph Casey and Katherine Koleski, China’s 12th Five-
Year Plan, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 1, last modified June 24, 2011, 
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf. 
356 Inkster, “Chinese Intelligence Agencies,” 42; Hachigian, “China’s Cyber-Strategy,” 119; C. Cindy 
Fan, “China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): From ‘Getting Rich First’ to ‘Common Prosperity,” 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 47, no. 6 (2006): 716–17, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/ 
downloads/597/300.pdf. 
357 Casey and Koleski, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, 1–2, 14; Fan, “China’s Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan”): 708. 
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Table 4.   Comparison of Previous Five-Year Plans (1996–2015) 
FYP Name Years   Covered 
Release  
Date 
China’s Strategic Emerging Industries 
(SEIs) Identified for Development 
12th Five-
Year Plan 2010-2015 March 2011 
- Clean Energy technology 
- Clean energy vehicles 
- Next generation information technology 
- Biotechnology 
- New materials 
- High-end equipment manufacturing 
- Alternative energy 
11th Five-
Year Plan 2006-2010 March 2006 
- Biotechnology 
- Next-generation information technology 
- High-end equipment manufacturing 
- Alternative energy 
10th Five-
Year Plan 2001-2005 March 2001 
- Next generation information technology 
- Communications technology 
- Telecommunications technology 
- High-end equipment manufacturing 
- Agricultural technologies 
9th Five-Year 
Plan 1996-2000 March 1996 
- Higher education institutions 
- Telecommunications technology 
- Next-generation information technology 
- Transportation methods 
Adapted from: Joseph Casey and Katherine Koleski, Backgrounder: China’s 12th Five -
Year Plan, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 8, 18–19, last 
modified June 24, 2011, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/12th-
FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf; “China Reports Investment figures for Ninth Five-Year Plan 
Period,” BBC Monitoring Worldwide, October 3, 2000, ProQuest (454370371); “China: 
Summary of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) – Information Industry,” APCO 
China, trans. Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (China), 5–6, 8, 10, 12–
13, 18–19, 24–25, accessed August 21, 2015, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/ 
public/documents/apcity/unpan022769.pdf; “China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-
2015) – the Full English Version,” China Direct, last modified September 11, 2011, 
http://cbi.typepad.com/china_direct/2011/05/chinas-twelfth-five-new-plan-the-full-
english-version.html; C. Cindy Fan, “China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): 
From ‘Getting Rich First’ to ‘Common Prosperity,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 
47, no. 6 (2006): 708–09, 713, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/597/300.pdf; 
National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(NPC&CPPCC), “The 8th Five-Year Plan (1991-1995),” last modified February 23, 
2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011npc/2011-02/23/content_12068062.htm; 
Mao Zhongying, ed., “China’s New S&T Development Plan,” China Science and 
Technology Newsletter, no. 456 (Beijing, China: Ministry of Science and Technology, 
November 10, 2006), http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/newsletters/2006/200611/t20061110_ 
37960.htm; Zhu Rongji, “Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development (2001)” (speech, Fourth Session of the Ninth 




As Table 4 highlights, FYP objectives have steadily evolved since 1996, from 
basic Internet development to high-end IT. Ever since the CCP welcomed the Internet 
into China, FYP objectives have shifted to incorporate technological development.358 
Upon comparing the 9th FYP’s objectives with subsequent FYPs, a noticeable shift in 
CCP priorities can be seen—from heavy manufacturing to IT equipment, education, and 
applications.359 China’s 12th FYP celebrates China’s successes in technological 
breakthroughs and software industries while simultaneously noting its lack of domestic 
innovation and R&D capacities.360 One would expect that if China is having 
technological breakthroughs that it would also show progress in domestic innovation and 
R&D capacities—unless those breakthroughs were a result of cyber espionage. 
As Table 4 and Figure 6 show, China’s 12th FYP emerged in 2011 and 
emphasized modernizing the PLA, continuing China’s economic growth, and developing 
China’s cyber capabilities to protect China’s core interests; these objectives subsequently 
affected the developmental pace and scope of China’s cyber strategy.361 The key 
development goals outlined in the 12th FYP are related to seven strategic emerging 
industries (SEI): aeronautical and space systems, IT, nanotechnology, and research, 
development, and acquisitions (RDA) processes (listed in Table 4 and Figure 6).362 The 
12th FYP objectives (and former FYPs) correlate to Chinese CNE targets, which 
indicates the high degree to which the FYPs also influence China’s cyber espionage 
targets. 
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Figure 6.  12th FYP Strategic Emerging Industries Targeted for Development 
 
Source: Joseph Casey and Katherine Koleski, Backgrounder: China’s 12th Five -Year 
Plan, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 19, last modified June 24, 
2011, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/12th-FiveYearPlan_062811.pdf.  
The parallels between China’s economic cyber espionage and FYP development 
areas strongly suggest China’s cyber strategy and the methods employed under that 
strategy are influenced by FYP objectives (as Figure 6 demonstrates). The 2015 Chinese 
cyber espionage of Avago Technologies and Skyworks Solutions cellular technology 
matches the next-generation IT and next-generation mobile communication goal; the 
2014 PLA-sponsored CNE of six U.S. energy companies for nuclear power, solar power, 
and steel manufacturing information matches the alternate energy source,  clean energy 
technology, and new materials development goals; the 2014 PLA-sponsored attack on 
U.S. TRANSCOM matches the high-end equipment manufacturing development goal.363 
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Put another way, each of the seven SEIs listed in Figure 6 have corresponding CNE 
operations in Table 6 that exploited those specific technologies. These links between 
Chinese CNE and China’s national objectives suggests that cyber espionage is part of a 
larger Chinese cyber strategy; it also suggests that the FYPs affect China’s strategic cyber 
orientation. PLA Unit 61398’s exploitation history of corresponding FYP objectives (in 
Figure 7) further exemplifies this point that FYPs influence China’s CNE targeting. 
China’s MLP also impacts China’s cyber strategy, which will be discussed in the 
following section.  
Figure 7.  Examples of PLA Unit 61398’s CNE Targeted Industries by Type 
and Number of Attacks  
 
Source: “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant (February 
2013), 24, http://intelreport.mandiant.com/.  
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b. Medium- and Long-Term Plans for the Development of Science and 
Technology 
Since 1956, China’s MLPs serve as the country’s “grand blueprint for science and 
technology development.”364 MLPs are released every 15 years to supplement the 
FYPs.365 China’s MLPs also exemplify domestic policies that impact China’s cyber 
strategy as well as the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed under that 
strategy.366 The MLP is released by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and 
provides the guidelines for China’s S&T development, as Table 5 shows.367 
Table 5.   China’s 2006–2020 MLP 
Title Years Covered Core Concepts 
Target Advancement 
Areas 
The National Program 
2006–2020 for the 
Development of 
Science and 
Technology in the 
Medium and Long 
Term” 








- Alternative energies 
- Information technology 
- High-end equipment 
manufacturing 
- Oceanology 
- Space and Aviation technology 
Adapted from: Mao Zhongying, ed., “China’s New S&T Development Plan,” China 
Science and Technology Newsletter, no. 456 (Beijing, China: Ministry of Science and 
Technology, November 10, 2006), http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/newsletters/2006/ 
200611/t20061110_37960.htm; Yang Lei, ed., “Innovation ‘Motive Power for 
Development,’” Xinhua, January 11, 2006, http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-01/11/ 
content_220696.htm. 
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The SEIs outlined in China’s current MLP match the biotechnology, alternative 
energies, information technology, and high-end equipment manufacturing SEIs in 
China’s 12th FYP; therefore, the aforementioned examples of Chinese CNE of FYP 
objective targets also match the MLP’s developmental objectives (also exemplified by 
Figure 7). The difference between FYPs and MLP is the MLP’s addition of specific 
ocean, aviation, and space technologies. The 2001–2013 CNE of U.S. defense contractor 
airframe and combat ship schematics, and the 2011 Chinese cyber espionage of 
multinational defense contractor firms match the MLP’s specific technology development 
objective.368 The correlation between Chinese CNE and MLP objectives suggests 
Chinese cyber espionage is also focused on developing domestic economic objectives, 
not just PLA modernization-related targets. Additionally, this multiplicity of objectives 
hints that cyber espionage might not be an exclusive driver for PLA modernization. 
While the use of cyber espionage in several development areas is not direct evidence of 
its limited role in PLA modernization, Section B (the next major section) of this chapter 
presents other evidence to corroborate this observation. 
c. A Comparison of China’s Developmental Goals and Cyber Espionage 
As previous sections discuss, China’s FYPs and MLPs identify clean energy, 
advanced information technology (cloud computing), biotechnology, high-quality R&D 
and manufacturing (aerospace, space, and transportation sectors), alternate energy 
sources (nuclear and solar), new materials, and clean energy vehicles (space, sea, and 
aerospace) SEIs as critical development areas.369 An examination of the domestic 
developmental targets in Table 3 suggests 10 or 11 of the 24 entries assisted national 
economic and development goals: the 2015 Chinese university exploitation of cellular 
technologies; the 2014 PLA Unit 61398 CNE of six U.S. alternative energy and 
manufacturing companies; Nitro; 2011 American Semiconductor (AMSC) cyber 
intrusion; Hidden Lynx; Operation Aurora; Shadows in the Cloud; NightDragon; 2006 
Comment Crew exploitation of Western firms; Shady Rat; Titan Rain. Some of these 
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operations, while they may have primarily targeted another area (like diplomatic or 
military targets) are also listed in this category for the economic impact they also 
potentially had.  
Even if the attributed entity was not a government or PLA entity, the cyber 
intrusions are categorized as assisting China’s developmental goals because the exploited 
information matches the CCP’s developmental objectives, and the information was 
extracted from foreign governments back to domestic Chinese servers. For example, in 
2011, a Chinese Energy Firm, Sinovel Wind Group, was a private entity that exploited 
AMSC software. Sinovel’s exploitation contributes to China’s FYP and MLP objectives 
of developing “alternative energy technologies” SEIs, even if it was not directly 
government-sponsored. In addition, upon comparing suspected Chinese CNE with the 
12th FYP’s SEIs, there are strong parallels: the 2014 PLA-sponsored intrusion on six 
U.S. energy companies for nuclear power, solar power, and steel manufacturing 
information matches the alternate energy source development and new materials goals; 
the 2014 PLA-sponsored attack on U.S. TRANSCOM matches the high-end equipment 
manufacturing development goal.  
While this study uses delineates diplomatic targets by their information and point 
of destination (in China), Lindsay notes the challenges of relying on this information: 
“Although Western cyber defenders can observe the exfiltration of petabytes of data to 
Chinese servers, they cannot…measure China’s ability to use the data.”370 This study 
acknowledges Lindsay’s demonstration of the difficulty of directly ascertaining how 
China employs exploited data and uses the above presented information to primarily 
demonstrate the range of cyber actors and target areas China pursues. Additionally, these 
parallels in Chinese CNE and developmental goals underscores that cyber espionage is 
not an exclusive tool used to modernize the PLA military. 
4. Cyber Intrusions that Likely Aided CCP Foreign Policy Objectives 
Breaking down the non-military targets in Table 3 further, an analysis of the 
targets suggests nine or ten of the 24 entries could have been CCP-directed against 
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diplomatic targets: 2015 OPM data exploitation, 2013 Calc Team exploitation of 
multinational firms, 2012 Calc Team exploitation of U.S. media companies, Taldor, 
Operation Aurora, GhostNet, Shadows in the Cloud, 2007 PLA exploitation of U.S. 
Secretary of Defense servers, and Shady Rat. The 2006–2009 Shady Rat operation was an 
example of a diplomatic target-oriented CNE operation that did not fall under 
developmental or PLA modernization goals but was crucial to CCP foreign policy 
objectives. This cyber espionage campaign is significant because it coincided with the 
2008 Beijing-sponsored Olympics. The 2006 PLA-sponsored cyber intrusion on the 
International Olympic Committee and the World Anti-Doping Agency matched China’s 
foreign policy aspirations to excel at hosting and participating in the Olympic Games. 
Military-related targets represent approximately one-third of the cyber espionage 
cases in Table 3; economic developmental-related targets represent the largest portion of 
the cyber espionage cases with a little more than one-third of the examples; and 
diplomatic CCP-prioritized targets represent approximately a little less than one-third of 
the cyber espionage cases. China’s cyber espionage has a divided subject focus as the 
relatively even breakdown between military-development, economic-development, and 
foreign-policy aiding cyber espionage targets highlights. 
The preceding analysis also suggests state-sponsored cyber espionage is not an 
exclusive  driver for PLA modernization. At the very least, the distribution of cases 
across three developmental target categories suggests that the PRC does not feel the need 
to allow PLA modernization to monopolize current cyber espionage resources. In order to 
test this indication that cyber espionage is not the exclusive mechanism behind PLA 
modernization, the next section examines the PLA’s alternate acquisitions methods. 
B. ALTERNATE ACQUISITION METHODS 
As previously discussed, in the wake of the PLA’s reduced defense budget and 
increased focus on China’s economic development during the first wave of PLA 
modernization, the PLA had to cultivate a military that was business-minded, 
economically savvy, and an independent fund-raiser. As a result, the PLA cultivated a 
robust acquisitions system that was cost effective, efficient, and kept PLA modernization 
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moving forward. This acquisitions system, prior to the emergence of the Information 
Age, included traditional espionage of foreign military and trade secrets, overt purchases 
of Russian and Southeast Asian military platforms (and then abuse of licensing through 
reverse engineering and copycat production without licenses), technology agreements 
with Western nations, and domestic R&D. This section examines the PLA’s alternate 
procurement, acquisitions, and R&D methods (apart from cyber espionage) to delimit the 
role cyber espionage has played in advancing PLA modernization efforts. 
1. Foreign Technological Assistance and Trade Agreements 
The PLA has not exclusively relied on cyber data exfiltration to modernize its 
military. When the modernization process began in 1978, the PLA did not yet have the 
technological means for cyber acquisitions; what the PLA did have, however, was a 
longstanding relationship with the Soviet Union.371 In its infancy, the PLA could not 
conduct CNE, so it focused its efforts on physical technological procurement—through 
technology transfers with the Soviet Union first and then later with other countries.372 
Technological export restrictions limit China’s access to Western technologies, but China 
has developed military procurement channels with Russia, the Middle East, and 
Southeast Asian partners to supplement this setback.373 Reports on China’s foreign 
technology acquisitions spending from 1991–2011, show a 300 percent increase in annual 
expenditures: from nine billion renminbi (RMB) in 1991 to 45 billion RMB in 2011.374 
China also encourages foreign firms to establish operations within China and invests in 
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foreign companies as part of its foreign acquisitions processes. These foreign investments 
allow China to engage in foreign technology transfers for military modernization 
purposes.375  
China engages in negotiated technology procurement and licensing with countries 
around the world. China’s foreign technology acquisitions are ranked just behind the 
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada in total technology trade 
agreements per year.376 Even though, Chinese companies have forged trade agreements 
with U.S. defense companies in the past, this section primarily presents examples of the 
PLA’s overt acquisitions and technology trade agreements with Russia to because they 
specifically address exchanges of modernized military platforms.377 This section’s 
identification of procured military equipment also illustrates that cyber espionage is not 
the sole driver behind PLA modernization. 
After Mao formed the PRC in 1949, the Soviet Union was the largest military 
equipment provider to China by supplying military designs, technical training, and Soviet 
experts on modernized military operations.378 Following the Soviet Union’s 
dismantlement in 1991, China made one of its most critical, military equipment purchases 
from the disadvantaged country: production licenses and parts for Russia’s modernized 
fighter jet, the Sukhoi-27 (Su-27).379 From 1994–1997, China also purchased Kilo-class 
submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia in a mutually acceptable arms 
transfer. These were critical, modern military equipment purchases because they were 
missile-equipped naval technologies that China had neither acquired, nor developed. 
From the mid-1990s-2008, Russia provided China more than $30 billion in military 
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equipment, platform designs, and arms sales.380 In 2014, China went under contract with 
Russia to purchase Russian S-400 long-range, self-guided surface-to-air missiles 
(SAM).381 These military purchases from the Soviet Union, and later Russia, allowed 
China to adapt and assimilate critical technology to modernize PLA forces. These 
acquisitions also had an equally important role in modernizing the PLA. In addition to its 
negotiated purchases and technology trade agreements, China and the PLA also exercise 
traditional espionage operations to bolster preexisting military procurement processes. 
2. Traditional Espionage Operations 
In addition to technology acquisitions, traditional espionage has also played a 
supporting role in PLA modernization. Since the 1400s, China has used traditional 
espionage to obtain foreign military and industrial secrets, as have all powers, which 
underscores China’s developed espionage TTPs. Since that time, China has used 
espionage to advance its domestic and military developmental goals helping China 
develop a robust espionage network that exploits military, diplomatic, and economic 
targets.382 As discussed in Chapter II (Section A), The U.S. EEA prosecutes cases that 
involve the theft, transfer or misappropriate of U.S. economic data, industry trade secrets, 
or proprietary information; several Chinese-attributed citizens are listed as violators of 
this espionage act.383 
The 124 cases prosecuted under the EEA involved an individual’s exploitation of 
trade secrets that recognized the high value the secrets would have for a foreign entity.384 
As a summary of U.S. EEA cases highlight, of the total 124 cases, approximately 20 
percent of them had some form of Chinese involvement—to include government-
sanctioned operations.385 Even though EEA cases frequently reference the theft of 
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economic and industrial trade secrets, the prosecuted cases also include theft of U.S. 
private defense industry designs and technology. If the operations were government-
sponsored, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) was likely the primary organizer of 
or collaborator with the espionage operations, since it specifically handles foreign 
intelligence operations.386 Additionally, reports indicate that China employs over two 
million people under its intelligence and foreign technology information collection 
missions.387 
Since the 1970s, there have been numerous examples of traditional Chinese 
espionage operations that assisted PLA modernization. Following the Soviet Union’s 
collapse in 1991, China engaged in overt military technology purchases with the Soviets; 
however, as Lindsay and Cheung note, some of China’s most advantageous traditional 
espionage was targeted against the Soviet Union after it imploded.388 China capitalized 
on its close proximity to the Soviet Union to infiltrate their critical infrastructure 
programs and recruit Soviet military scientists and engineers to assist with PLA 
modernization objectives.389 As discussed in Chapter I, beginning in the late 1970s, 
Chinese-native Dongfan Chung physically transferred thousands of documents on U.S. 
military-contracted rockets, bomber aircraft, fourth generation fighter aircraft, and 
helicopter technical data over the course of 27 years, back to China.390 Chung obtained 
employment with the U.S. Aerospace Boeing Company to obtain the data, and his 
espionage efforts directly contributed to PLA modernization objectives in the third and 
fourth waves of PLA modernization.391 China also leveraged non-Chinese citizens to 
conduct espionage on its behalf.  
Some of the espionage cases that have assisted PLA modernization over the years 
have also been conducted by third-party, seemingly non-government connected 
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individuals. For example, in 2002, two Russian-descent U.S. citizens sold sensitive 
Russian satellite technology to a Chinese entity.392 Additionally, in July 2011, a 
Taiwanese General sold military secrets to China.393 In 2011, U.S. military officials also 
reported suspected cases of Chinese-sponsored espionage against U.S. military forces 
stationed in Chile.394 There are many more examples of traditional Chinese espionage 
operations, but these cases and information about China’s intelligence collection 
highlight the relative success, efficiency, and prominence traditional espionage plays in 
China’s and the PLA’s acquisitions processes. Traditional espionage has, in concert with 
cyber espionage, had a role in PLA modernization and helped the PLA’s developmental 
goals move forward. In addition to espionage, China also has robust R&D methods that 
also assist PLA modernization.  
3. Indigenous Research and Development Initiatives 
In addition to the technology exchanges and international procurement 
agreements the PLA has also progressed its domestic R&D infrastructure. Despite 
scholarly articles, publications, and master’s theses (like U.S. Navy Lieutenant 
Commander, Gary L. Pembleton’s) that list China’s indigenous innovative and R&D 
capacities as underdeveloped and inefficient (as compared to U.S. and developed nations’ 
innovative capacity), China has developed a robust, effectual research and reverse 
engineering process that transforms developed Western military technologies into PLA 
military equipment with “Chinese characters.”395 Chinese scientists are able to adapt 
foreign-acquired technology, reverse engineer them, improve the designs, add “Chinese 
characteristics” and reproduce them so that they are functional for the PLA military.396 
Director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), Tai Ming Cheung, 
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describes China’s unique, adaptive research process as the “introduce, digest, absorb, and 
re-innovate (IDAR)” Model.397 
a. The IDAR Model 
According to Cheung, China’s equipment development process, under IDAR, 
involves overt military acquisitions, traditional espionage, and unclassified and classified 
information exploitation.398 IDAR’s unclassified research involves Chinese researchers 
scouring open-sources and media for publicly available information; the classified 
research is conducted by the PLA military as cyber espionage which was previously 
discussed.399 The open source research does not include CNE or CNA methods and 
further reinforces that China’s acquisitions system incorporates a multitude of 
procurement methods. Reverse engineering is also a prominent feature of the IDAR 
model.400 Once China obtains the information—whether from espionage, trade, purchase, 
or unclassified research—the exploited information is then processed by Chinese 
engineers and reformatted to serve PLA functions.401 An added advantage of IDAR is it 
allows China a degree of separation, and it allows China to decipher trends in other 
countries’ military R&D so it can exploit them in future innovation. Indicating IDAR is a 
continuing trend in China’s R&D strategy, over 50,000 personnel at 400 research centers 
are dedicated to this mission.402 
b. Research and Development Programs 
China’s 863 Program, 973 Program, and rural R&D programs are indigenous 
Chinese government initiatives that supplement China’s cyber espionage, military 
procurement channels, and traditional espionage acquisitions methods. China’s 863 
Program, also known as the National High Technology Research and Development 
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Program, began in 1986. The 863 Program became a way for China to pinpoint specific 
technologies for scientific research and to jumpstart China’s domestic innovation.403 The 
863 Program reinforces the SEIs outlined in China’s FYPs and provides guidelines for 
the development of high-end technologies.404 The 973 Program is similar to the 863 
Program, but it provides funding to civilian institutes and PLA-sponsored militias for 
basic research purposes.405 One of the notable successes of the 863 and 973 programs has 
been the cultivation of robust, indigenous R&D in China’s domestic UAV industry.406 
Apart from major core national science and technology plans—863 and 973 
Programs—China relies on small research programs that are geared toward regional and 
local R&D efforts: the Torch Program, Spark Program, and New Product Program.407 
These three programs were initiated in the late 1980s to aid China’s regional and local 
R&D efforts.408 The Torch Program focuses on the development of high-end technology 
to improve China’s economic and industrial infrastructures; the Spark Program provides 
funds for rural technology development; and the New Product Program provides funding 
to state institutions and research facilities to develop high-end technology and industrial 
equipment.409 The Chinese government devotes up to 20 percent of its annual indigenous 
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R&D budget to these programs.410 While many of these R&D programs focus on rural 
development and basic technology research, they still contribute to China’s overall 
development of modernized technology and generates technological breakthroughs that 
ultimately benefit the PLA’s modernization efforts. China’s IDAR model and indigenous 
research programs demonstrate other acquisitions methods the PLA has at its disposal to 
modernize its military equipment. The next section compares all the previously discussed 
acquisition methods with the PLA’s modernized military equipment to determine if one 
method (namely cyber espionage) is used more heavily than others.  
C. A CASE STUDY OF MODERNIZED PLA MILITARY PLATFORMS 
As the previous sections discuss, the PLA developed alternate acquisitions to 
modernize the military without virtual assistance. This section, and Table 6 specifically, 
compares modernized PLA systems (across the PLAAF, the PLAN, and PLA Army) with 
their respective acquisitions methods to decipher trends among frequently used methods. 
This section shows that, while the PLA employs cyber espionage to modernize the 
military, cyber espionage complements the PLA’s alternate and preexisting procurement 
methods.  
Table 6 has been formulated by integrating a variety of unclassified government, 
DOD, scholarly articles and books, media reports, and database sources.411 The U.S. 
equivalent models are listed to directly address defense reports that make the assumption 
that Chinese cyber espionage of U.S. military designs is the reason for the progression of 
their respective Chinese models. The U.S. equivalent models were also generated based 
on their similarity in design, technical specifications, and modernized status in relation to 
the Chinese model. Additionally, the developmental times are listed to highlight the 
difference in production times between exclusively non-cyber influenced systems and 
CNE-assisted systems: the exclusively non-cyber produced systems often took additional 
years to develop. For this table, the “approximate development time” began on the 
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earliest reported date (year) researching and theorizing (as IGCC consultant, Maggie 
Marcum, terms the “pre-program” phase)412 on the modernized military platform 
commenced, not on the date physical production began. For example, Marcum’s research 
shows China’s “pre-program” phase for the J-11B took approximately 20 years to 
complete, extended the total development time of the entire aircraft to 35 years.413 In 
another example, publications show as early as the 1950s, Chinese naval and 
administrative officials began the process of attempting to acquire an aircraft carrier, 
which puts the total development time at 62 years based on its production date in 
2012.414 
Indigenous R&D efforts, when listed under the “Cyber Compromise?” category, 
include reverse engineering, copycat production, and assimilated technology from 
traditional espionage operations. The military platforms listed under “critical military 
technology” are representative examples based on their relatively recent production year 
(after 2000) to address claims that the PLA has rapidly modernized its military equipment 
in the 21st century.415 Additionally, this study attempted to pull modernized military 
platforms from each PLA branch (PLAAF, PLAN, and the PLA Army) to demonstrate 
the diverse modernization efforts the PLA has undertaken. 
In several of the “critical military technology” cases China outright purchased the 
military platform, but the platforms are still included in Table 6 to show the range of non-
cyber acquisition methods the PLA employs. For example, China’s aircraft carrier the 
Liaoning is a product of both indigenous R&D and China’s negotiated purchases with 
several countries.416 In some examples China may have purchased the military platform, 
                                                 
412 Marcum, “Global Fighter Development Timelines,” 2–3. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Erickson, Denmark, and Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’” 17–18; Adrew Erickson and Gabe 
Collins, “Introducing the ‘Liaoning’: China’s New Aircraft Carrier and What it Means,” Wall Street 
Journal, September 25, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/09/25/introducing-the-liaoning-
chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-and-what-it-means/. 
415 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities,” 
244–45, 259; Annual Report to Congress: 2015, 22, 35; Annual Report to Congress: 2014, 35; 
Heginbotham et al., U.S.-China Military Scorecard, xix-xx, 24–25. 
416 Erickson, Denmark, and Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’” 18–19. 
 106 
but the technical information or system components were potentially cyber compromised 
and are therefore listed as “X/+” or both yes and no for “cyber compromise.” 
In the “cyber compromise” category, an “X” represents no: that the military 
platform was not cyber compromised. A “X/+” in the “cyber compromise” category 
represents a yes and no: parts of the military platform were cyber compromised and other 
components of the system were not. The military platforms that were completely 
modernized absent of cyber espionage assistance are highlighted in green; the platforms 
that combined cyber espionage and alternate procurement methods are highlighted in 
yellow; and the platforms that likely exclusively relied on CNE for modernization 
assistance are highlighted in red. 
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Table 6 identifies 21 examples of modernized PLA military equipment and 
compares them with open source information that details their respective acquisition 
methods. Table 6 provides evidence indicating that the PLA uses cyber espionage as a 
complementary procurement method—in conjunction with technology purchases, 
traditional espionage, and indigenous R&D—to modernize the military. This study shows 
that, out of the PLA’s modernized platforms, four out of the 21 entries (approximately 19 
percent) were likely exclusive products of cyber espionage; 10 of the 21 entries 
(approximately 48 percent) were likely derivatives from exclusively non-cyber 
acquisition methods (whether by reverse engineering, negotiated purchases, or traditional 
espionage); and seven of the 21 entries (approximately 33 percent) are likely products of 
both cyber espionage and non-cyber procurement methods.  
Upon further examination of Table 6, non-cyber methods are used in 17 of the 
examples (approximately 81 percent), while cyber espionage is employed in only 11 of 
the examples (approximately 52 percent). Additionally, some form of Russian 
involvement is noted in 13 of the 21 total entries (approximately 62 percent). The high 
degree of Russian involvement also indicates that U.S. military technology is not 
necessarily the source of the PLA’s sophisticated military platforms, as many defense 
reports suggest. If cyber espionage is the primary driver for PLA modernization—instead 
of a complementary method—the study would show more exclusive cyber espionage-
developed military equipment over non-cyber developed systems; however, in actuality, 
non-cyber acquisitions methods represent the majority of the sampled cases. This 
observation supports the potential explanation that, contrary to U.S. defense report 
assumptions, cyber espionage is not the sole driver behind PLA modernization efforts: it 
is a complementary method that acts in concert to the PLA’s alternate acquisition 
methods.417 
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D. SUMMARY 
Based on the review of Chinese cyber espionage versus modernized PLA military 
equipment in Tables 3 and 6, there is no question that China—whether government-
sponsored or not—uses cyber espionage as a tool to advance PLA modernization 
initiatives, domestic objectives, and foreign policy goals. Upon examining the sampling 
of CNE incidents, the evidence suggests there is a relatively equal division of cyber 
espionage efforts toward all target categories: military targets comprise approximately 
one-third of the cases, domestic developmental targets make up a little more than 
approximately one-third of the cases, and diplomatic targets are a little under 
approximately one-third of the cases. The relatively equal division of cyber targets 
suggests that cyber espionage missions are equally divided across PLA mission sets and 
therefore are not solely focused on the narrow goal of exploiting foreign networks, thus 
assisting PLA modernization.  
In addition to the PLA’s cyber espionage profile, the military also heavily relies 
on foreign military technology purchases from Russia and other international partners; 
traditional espionage operations conducted by Chinese citizens, companies, or co-opted 
individuals; and indigenous reverse engineering, IDAR, or basic R&D programs to 
modernize the military. These robust, pre-existing alternate acquisitions methods support 
the conclusion that cyber espionage is not the sole method driving PLA modernization. 
The examination of modernized PLA military platforms also solidifies that conclusion. 
Upon identifying the acquisitions methods for 21 modern PLA military platforms 
(whether cyber espionage or alternate methods), the majority of modernized equipment 
was developed from non-cyber means. Consequently, cyber espionage’s role in PLA 
modernization is a supplementary mechanism to alternate factors.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Due to the rapidly evolving nature of cyber applications and the virtual domain, 
this thesis primarily relies on up-to-date, unclassified research material to provide an 
accurate discussion on how state-sponsored cyber espionage fits into PLA modernization. 
This thesis provides both a widely accessible, unclassified medium for field reference and 
also addresses emerging defense reports that make the key assumption that cyber 
espionage is the sole, primary driver for PLA modernization. This thesis did not argue 
against conclusions that China’s cyber espionage profile is increasing across the virtual 
domain; in fact, much of the research in this study reinforces that conclusion. This thesis 
did, however, address the U.S. defense reports that assume cyber espionage is the sole 
driver behind the PLA’s rapid advancement. Ultimately this thesis determines that while 
cyber espionage and cyber intrusions have and continue to assist PLA modernization, 
cyber espionage works in concert with other procurement methods (foreign technology 
acquisitions, traditional espionage, and indigenous R&D) as a supplementary, not 
primary method. In order to build the evidentiary foundation that state-sponsored cyber 
espionage is a complementary acquisitions tool in PLA modernization, this thesis 
examines the progression of PLA modernization, China’s cyber strategy, and Chinese 
CNE operations. 
A. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study finds that China employs and will continue to employ cyber espionage 
as a sanctioned and necessary cyber application under China’s cyber strategy—regardless 
of the target type—to achieve its strategic goals. This study has also determined that 
cyber espionage is just one of the several components driving forward PLA 
modernization. The question that arises from these conclusions is: How do these forces 
affect China’s international stance on cyber warfare; specifically, will it be feasible for 
China to adhere to “no cyberattack pacts” and “cyber nonaggression pacts” that it 
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individually forged with the United States and Russia in 2015?418 Using this study’s 
previously presented evidence base, this section examines the implications and feasibility 
of the cyber pacts China signed in May and September 2015, respectively. This section 
also discusses potential U.S. responses to China’s CNO. In order to discuss the 
implications for China, regarding its U.S. and Russian agreements, this section first 
distinguishes the differences in the two pacts. 
China and Russia solidified their cyber agreement in May 2015, as a symbolic 
move toward increased cooperation.419 The cyber nonaggression agreement focuses on 
bilateral sharing of ideas, technology, information, and technical cyber expertise. The 
agreement also provides a general outline of cyberspace threats to China and Russia (the 
Internet and Western countries’ cyber operations) that the two countries can jointly 
defend against.420  
The high number of Russian military technology transfer cases and negotiated 
defense sales from Russia to China suggest that this agreement may be upheld by both 
parties. China is induced to uphold the pact because Russia is China’s largest foreign 
technology provider, and Russia assistance will help the PLA modernize more rapidly. 
Russia is induced to uphold the pact because Russia’s modernized military is one of the 
few most developed forces that can combat the U.S. military. Once the PLA reaches a 
complete, developed level of modernization, both Russia and China would be able to 
combat U.S. military capabilities in cases of future conflict, such as Syria or Taiwan. 
While this pact may not decrease the number of cyber espionage operations each country 
conducts against foreign entities (or each other), it does symbolize a working partnership 
on modern issues between Russia and China. This pact is also a crucial factor to study 
when determining, in IR terms, how China or Russia will rise in power in the 
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international system. Based on China’s and Russia’s strong history of cooperation and 
technology sharing, China will likely be able to uphold its agreement with Russia. 
In contrast to the Sino-Russian cyber agreement, the U.S.-China cyber agreement 
contained more direct language. The U.S.-China non-cyberattack agreement addresses 
the U.S.’s primary concern of limiting China’s high-volume, economic-targeted cyber 
espionage operations.421 The agreement came after the United States pressured China 
with economic sanctions if the CCP did not control its domestic Chinese CNE 
operations.422 The agreement states that neither country will pursue state-sponsored 
cyber espionage against economic, industrial, or intellectual property targets.423 The pact 
does not, however, put restrictions on state-sponsored cyber espionage against 
government or military targets, parallel to what is typically accepted with traditional 
espionage in conventional warfare.424 Both countries signed the pact on September 25, 
2015; however, one day later (September 26, 2015), a U.S. Cyber Monitoring Firm, 
CrowdStrike, announced that Chinese APTs attempted CNE on U.S. industrial and 
economic targets. Based on this thesis’ study of China’s cyber strategy, was China’s 
agreement to the cyber non-attack pact really feasible? The answer to the question is both 
yes and no. 
Media reports frequently cite China’s arrest of several hackers in early September 
2015 as evidence that China will uphold the pact, in accordance with U.S. wishes.425 U.S. 
media uses these arrests as examples that China is serious about remaining true to the 
pact’s non-economic target parameters. These arrests, however, could have also been a 
part of China’s “Operation Clean Internet” that identifies and tracks cyber criminals who 
                                                 
421 Obama, “Remarks by Obama and Xi.”  
422 Ellen Nakashima and Adam Goldman, “In a First, Chinese Hackers are Arrested at the Behest of 
the U.S. Government,” Washington Post, October 9, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
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423 Ibid.; Kelly Jackson Higgins, “CrowdStrike Spots Chinese APTs Targeting U.S. Firms Post-Pact,” 
Information Tech, last modified October 19, 2015, http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-
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424 Ibid.; Tucker, “White House: No Cyber Attack.”  
425 Nakashima and Goldman, “Chinese Hackers Arrested at Behest of U.S.”  
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have conducted attacks on domestic Chinese targets.426 This domestic campaign is an 
effort to improve China’s domestic cybersecurity and arrest individuals who commit acts 
of identity theft and financial data theft. 
Also arguing that the cyber pact is unfeasible for China to uphold, many China 
scholars classify the agreement as purely “symbolic.”427 The cyber agreement is partially 
unfeasible because China’s cyber strategy is oriented around strategic principles that do 
not distinguish between military and economic targets. Cyber espionage of U.S. 
economic (and any type of) technology allows China to both supplement its weak R&D 
infrastructure and maintain an advantage over the United States. Additionally, due to the 
ambiguous, non-attributable nature of cyberspace, it is relatively easy for China to deny 
that any CNE on U.S. economic targets came directly from sanctioned Chinese 
government entities. The non-cyberattack pact is unfeasible because Chinese perspectives 
on cyberspace and cyber strategy are neither compatible with the agreement nor U.S. 
views on sanctioned cyber targets. Consequently, the cyber intrusions are not likely to 
stop.  
Additionally, the pact did not provide exact parameters for what the United States 
and China would constitute as an economic target. For example, critical infrastructure, 
which includes water or communications companies, was not specifically defined under 
the pact.428 Therefore, China, who does not recognize different categorical types of CNE 
targets, can claim ignorance for any cyber espionage that does occur.429 If Chinese 
entities conducted cyber espionage on U.S. companies that supported these functions, 
China could potentially claim they were not economic targets, while the U.S. would 
disagree. Ultimately, even though President Xi will be able to uphold the language of the 
agreement by not pursing government-sanctioned CNE on U.S. economic targets, the 
pact was unfeasible for China to agree to because its strategic views do not correspond to 
                                                 
426 “China Arrests 15,000 Suspects for Alleged Cybercrimes,” CNN Money, August 19, 2015, 
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the U.S.’s strategic outlook on cyber espionage. As long as China has developmental 
goals and strong commitment to achieving them by any means, China will continue to 
pursue cyber espionage on economic targets. 
There is other evidence that suggests that the pact is relatively feasible, and China 
will be able to uphold the agreement. The wide variance in Chinese cyber actors 
(government, military, militia, university, private groups, and individuals), demonstrated 
by Table 3 in Chapter V, and the overlapping manner in which they conduct CNE 
operations, should allow China to adhere to the language of the non-cyberattack 
agreement. President Xi could adjust China’s cyber strategy to allow for military and 
government entities to focus on exploiting foreign military and government defense 
technology—since those targets are not prohibited under the agreement. Xi could then 
leave the economic cyber-targeting to other domestic Chinese entities without being 
involved, thus upholding the agreement by not pursuing government-sanctioned CNE on 
U.S. economic targets. 
Non-government actors are still incentivized to conduct cyber espionage 
operations—but specifically on economic targets—for the high value those targets hold 
for many domestic Chinese and foreign firms. Their exploitation of economic targets 
progresses China’s developmental industries listed in the FYPs and MLP and thus 
benefits Chinese society as a whole. Non-government hackers do not (and would not) 
need to be sanctioned by the Chinese government because, as long as they exploited U.S. 
economic targets, their actions would likely not be condemned: the hackers’ actions 
would be recognized as operations that benefit domestic China. Additionally, Table 3’s 
information further upholds this conclusion, because it shows that China relies on cyber 
espionage of U.S. economic targets to achieve several of its FYP developmental goals. 
While Xi may be able to uphold the spirit of the cyber non-attack agreement by not 
directly sanctioning economic cyber intrusions, he will not be able to stop cyberattacks. If 
this is the case, then how does the United States respond? 
The United States could use several methods of cyber, non-cyber, economic, and 
diplomatic means to respond to China’s cyber espionage actions, related or not related to 
the non-attack cyber agreement. Since intellectual property and private industry 
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innovation are of the utmost importance to the United States, the U.S. government could 
institute a higher level of protection among private industries. The U.S. government 
already partners with U.S. defense and government-cleared contract companies for basic 
cybersecurity awareness, but these programs do not provide the level of protection 
needed to safeguard against high-volume Chinese CNE. The U.S. government could 
partner with private industries to provide contracted government-level security that 
protects private corporations from cyber intrusions; specifically hire and contract out 
security firms (like Mandiant, McAfee, DGI, ThreatConnect, and CrowdStrike) to 
provide cyber security solutions to private companies, if they do not already. If the 
private corporations opted out of the government-provided cybersecurity, the United 
States government could encourage U.S. cybersecurity firms, like Mandiant, to produce 
more unclassified reports. These unclassified reports would be a free, unclassified tool for 
U.S. industrial partners to reference. This would allow them to increase awareness on 
Chinese cyber entities’ TTPs and frequent targets. These reports would also allow the 
U.S. government to build more evidence against Chinese hacker groups to support the 
government’s claims against China. 
Additionally, the United States could use the cyber pacts between itself, China, 
and Russia to pursue international agreements on cyber operations. While it is unlikely 
that any country will agree to international sanctions on specific cyber actions (because 
many countries rely on cyber means to monitor adversarial nations), the United States 
could pursue the establishment of a consensus on cyber terms and the severity level of 
cyber operations. For example, would “cyberattack” include cyber operations like cyber 
intrusions, CNE, CNA? If the United States pursued a common definitional 
understanding across the international community, this could alleviate confusion between 
itself and China in future cyber agreements; it could also preemptively prevent tensions 
between newly developed countries that begin to test their cyber espionage skills on a 
wide scale. Since it is difficult to reach international consensus on a domain (cyber) that 
is in constant evolution, the United States could bolster its domestic capabilities to match 
China’s CNO. Future research in alternate areas of study that this thesis did not address, 
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however, could also provide more insight into how the United States could bolster its 
domestic cybersecurity to protect against Chinese cyber espionage. 
B. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As mentioned in the literature review, the intricate debates over topics of PLA 
modernization, China’s cyber strategy, and Chinese cyber espionage can be studied in 
further depth. Apart from addressing key discussions in the literature, this thesis also 
identifies additional areas for future research in China’s cyber strategy. This thesis 
concentrates on exclusively unclassified, open-source information, so a beneficial avenue 
for future research that would directly respond to this study’s research findings would be 
classified research and data. Due to the secretive, largely unsanctioned nature of cyber 
espionage, it is likely that more information regarding Chinese cyber espionage is 
contained in classified reports. Consequently, a research question that could be pursued, 
using both classified and unclassified information, is: Would classified information 
change previous conclusions about China’s cyber strategy and cyber espionage 
operations? The inclusion of classified information regarding Chinese cyber espionage 
and PLA modernization could significantly bolster or revise many unclassified reports 
that did not address classified data.430 
Another area of future research would involve more technical cyber skills and 
computer science knowledge. This thesis concentrates on identifying the conceptual 
tenets of China’s cyber strategy and does not go into detail on the technical aspects of 
China’s employment of specific malware types. An in-depth examination of Chinese 
CNE operations, compared to the malware programs used, could provide insight into how 
China’s CNO strategy is oriented. This examination would also address the primary 
debate in the literature regarding whether China’s cyber strategy is more offensive or 
defensive in nature. A potential research question for this area of study is: What does 
China’s use of certain cyber applications or malware programs in state-sponsored cyber 
                                                 
430 Of course, classified information may also be incomplete. A key feature of the cyber domain is the 
difficulty of knowing how much is not known, at classified as well as unclassified levels. Examining the 
conclusions of this thesis in light of classified information would certainly advance knowledge, but 
possibly only by underscoring the limitations of that knowledge. 
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warfare suggest about the orientation of its cyber strategy? Within that research question, 
it would also be beneficial to investigate why China’s employs certain malware 
programs. This area of future research contributes to a large debate in Chinese cyber 
literature and also provides additional potential explanations for why China’s cyber 
strategy operates the way it does. 
This thesis also focuses on explaining current Chinese cyber operations and 
strategies and does not detail how that information could be tapped by the United States’ 
or other Chinese-targeted countries’ to bolster their CND against Chinese cyber 
espionage. Specifically, how could the United States leverage what it knows about how 
China’s cyber strategy is implemented to appropriately respond or create a legal 
framework that allows China to uphold these principles and also allows the United States 
to protect its intellectual property? In reference to China’s CNO strategy, a future 
research question to explore is: How could the United States use what it knows about 
China’s strategic cyber principles to create a comprehensive defense against it? 
The last areas for future research correspond to specific countries and regional 
focuses: the South China Sea and North Korea. One research avenue would involve the 
examination of Chinese cyber espionage or cyber intrusions employed against countries 
operating in the South China Sea oceanic territory China claims. A possible research 
question is: How does China’s use of certain cyber applications, like state-sponsored 
cyber warfare, fit into its actions in the South China Sea? 
Another topic of research could involve China’s cyber assistance to North Korea. 
A question that arises from this topic is: How does China’s technical and cyber assistance 
affect North Korea’s regime; specifically, does it help the North Korean regime maintain 
its unstable rule? This avenue of research provides insight into several areas: the nature of 
China’s and North Korea’s relationship; the nature of North Korea’s cyber capabilities 
and cyber strategy; and a potential explanation for how the belligerent, underdeveloped 
North Korean regime remains in power. 
There are several future areas for research due to the rapid evolution of virtual 
applications and the increase of nations’ use of cyber warfare. Due to this rapidly 
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changing virtual environment, basic cyber definitions are contested and dynamic. This 
thesis provides insight into one facet of cyber warfare: cyber espionage. Future studies, 
reflecting on newer developments and perhaps using evolved conceptual definitions, 
could potentially reach alternate conclusions. Nevertheless, this thesis’ study of the 
important role that cyber espionage plays in China’s military modernization indicates that 
the virtual realm and cyber warfare are growing key areas for research, as national 
networks become more interconnected, nations conduct more of their operations online, 
and hackers continue to exploit these areas through cyber applications. 
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